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Abstract
Nowadays owners and users of software systems want their executions to be reliable and se-
cure. Runtime enforcement is a common mechanism for ensuring that system or program
executions adhere to constraints specified by a security policy. It is based on two properties:
the enforcement mechanism should leave legal executions without changes (transparency)
and make sure that illegal executions are amended (soundness).
From the theory side, the literature proposes the precise characterization of legal ex-
ecutions that represent a security policy and thus is enforced by mechanisms like security
automata or edit automata. Unfortunately, transparency and soundness do not distinguish
what happens when an execution is actually illegal (the practical case). They only tell that
the outcome of an enforcement mechanism should be “legal”, but not how far the illegal
execution should be changed.
In this thesis we address the gap between the theory of runtime enforcement and the
practical case. First, we explore a set of policies that represent legal executions in terms
of repeated legal iterations and propose a constructive enforcement mechanism that can
deal with illegal executions by eliminating illegal iterations. Second, we introduce a new
notion of predictability, that puts a restriction on the way illegal executions are modified by
an enforcement mechanism. Third, we propose an automatic construction of enforcement
mechanisms that is able to tolerate some insignificant errors of the user and we prove it
to have a sufficient degree of predictability.
The main case study of this thesis is a business process from a medical organization.
A number of discussions with the partners from this organization shows the validity of the
approaches described in this thesis in practical cases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Importance of Execution Monitoring
Nowadays owners of business processes want their executions to be secure and compliant
with different regulations, including privacy; mobile device users want their private infor-
mation to stay on their devices; the users of web applications want to be protected from
the hackers’ attacks. Unfortunately the features of those applications are at odds with
the current security models.
The first problem is that the developers of largely used applications such as mobile
games or social network applications claim to be compliant with the privacy policies of
their company, but they are not obliged to be compliant with security policies of the end
users. However, the end users start having more and more security requirements.
The second problem is that once an application is installed, there is no general control
over what the application is doing at its runtime. It can potentially collect some amount
of private information and send it to the remote server. For example, BGR (Boy Genious
Report weblog, a pioneer in breaking news within the mobile gadget sector) have revealed
the fact that the Facebook application once it is installed on a smartphone, synchronizes all
phone numbers from the smartphone contact list and stores them on Facebook server [32].
Model carrying code [60] or Security-by-Contract [11] claims that there is a solution to
this problem. These approaches propose to equip the code with security claims that are
later matched against the platform security and privacy policies. This matching checking
is done when the program is going to be deployed on the mobile device. However, there
are some properties of programs that cannot be checked at deployment time.
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To overcome these drawbacks, a number of authors have proposed to enforce the
compliance of applications with security policies by execution monitoring. The idea is
to monitor the execution of the program at runtime and control its compliance to the
security policies. Traditional security automata [59] were essentially sequence recognizers
that stopped the execution as soon as an illegal sequence of actions (not compliant with the
policy) was on the eve of being performed. They were proven to enforce safety properties.
In the following years a number of refinements have been proposed, for example
Hamlen’s work on rewriting [45] and Ligatti et al. works on edit automata [7, 51]. The
latter work proposes a model of mechanisms that are not only recognizing the correct
behavior of applications, but are also capable of transforming their behavior. This power
gives edit automata the capability of enforcing more than safety properties and it was
proven that they are able to enforce a richer class of properties, called renewal properties.
The fact that an edit automaton provably and effectively enforces a given security
policy was formalized by two notions: soundness (all transformed executions comply
with the policy) and transparency (the semantics of compliant executions should not be
changed).
1.2 Problem Statement
Transformation of non-compliant executions We started our research by trying to
formally show “as an exercise” that the running example of edit automaton from [7]
provably enforces a given security policy by applying the effective enforcement theorem
(Theorem 8) from the very same paper. Unfortunately, we failed.
As a result of this failure, we decided to make a deeper investigation and discovered
that the impossibility of reconciling the running example with the theorem on the very
same paper is a consequence of a gap between the edit automata that one can possibly
write and the edit automata that can be constructed by existing techniques (Theorem 8
from [7], Theorem 3.3 from [51] or by Talhi et al. [61]).
Issue 1 Two edit automata are effectively enforcing the same security property. Can we
formally capture what makes them different?
Automatic construction of enforcement mechanism When an enforcement mech-
anism is specified manually (as in many state-of-the-art papers and as in the example of
edit automaton from [7]), a number of mistakes can be made, since one should precisely
define how the illegal executions are transformed into the legal ones and the notions of
soundness and transparency do not help to define this transformations.
4
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Issue 2 There is no generic algorithm to construct an enforcement mechanism from the
given security property, such that this mechanism enforces the property in question in a
desirable way.
Notions of soundness and transparency are not sufficient We have found out
that different mechanisms provide different enforcement for the same security policy, even
though these mechanisms are sound and transparent. In the current theory of runtime
enforcement there is no notion that gives at least some information on how the non-
compliant execution sequences should be modified by an enforcement mechanism.
Issue 3 Soundness and transparency only describe what happens to legal executions. A
new notion should be able to discriminate execution transformers on the basis of what
happens to the illegal executions.
Toleration of user insignificant errors In practice a security policy is a description
of the compliant behavior of the given system. When applied to business processes, it
describes the desirable behavior of a business process, for example, in compliance with
applicable rules and regulations. Runtime enforcement mechanisms in these systems
would observe the actual executions of the processes and control their compliance.
In this particular setting, a policy representing the compliant behavior of the system
can be seen as a protocol that the system should follow. Enforcing such a policy means
insuring that the system behaves according to the predefined protocol. Since this thesis
focuses on building runtime enforcement mechanisms in this thesis, we will use notions
from the runtime enforcement theory; hence the notion of “policy” will be used also to
describe the “official protocol” of the system behavior.
There are two main requirements to the enforcement mechanisms: 1) the resulting pro-
cesses must be compliant with the desired behavior (“policy”); 2) the end users should
not be disturbed in their primary mission (for example doctors and nurses in the hospital
should deliver drugs to the patients) even if an insignificant deviation from the desired
process happened. These possible insignificant deviations are difficult to write, to check
and to communicate to the users. Hence we think that the runtime enforcement mech-
anism should be able to tolerate such deviations and manage them as automatically as
possible.
Issue 4 There is no generic construction of runtime enforcement mechanism that can
tolerate insignificant deviations from the specified policy.
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Figure 1.1: Hierarchy of edit automata
1.3 Contributions
The work in this thesis focuses on runtime enforcement mechanisms, their models and
properties. The investigation started with the gap found in the runtime enforcement
theory and a number of solutions have been proposed. The thesis is structured in a way
to reflect several main contributions.
1.3.1 Classification of Enforcement Mechanisms
We start with presenting the first result of our investigation. We address Issue 1 by
analyzing the examples from [7]. We have built a hierarchy of several kinds of edit
automata and found a relation between them.
Figure 1.1 shows the relation between the classes of edit automata that we have es-
tablished. All-Or-Nothing automata output the whole execution sequence or suppress
the next incoming action. The notion of effective=enforcement comprises soundness and
transparency. Late automata are a particular kind of edit automata that always output
some prefix of the input. Longest-valid-prefix automata for P are automata constructed
according to the proof of Theorem 8 of [7]. We give more details in the main body of the
thesis. This contribution has led to the following workshop and follow-up international
journal publication:
• N. Bielova and F. Massacci. Do you really mean what you actually enforced? In
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and
6
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Figure 1.2: Relationships between security properties
Trust, volume 5491 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 287-301. Springer-
Verlag Heidelberg, 2008. [12]
• N. Bielova and F. Massacci. Do you really mean what you actually enforced? Inter-
national Journal of Information Security, pages 239-254, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/s10207-
011-0137-2. [14]
1.3.2 Automatic Construction of Enforcement Mechanisms and
Iterative Properties
We propose an algorithm for the automatic construction of enforcement mechanisms given
a security policy represented as an automaton that combines the acceptance conditions
of a finite-state automaton and a Bu¨chi automaton. The construction is given for two
types of mechanisms. The first one always outputs the longest valid prefix of a tentative
execution sequence. We call it Longest-valid-prefix automaton.
The second mechanism, called Iterative Suppression automaton, is a novel runtime en-
forcement technique. It outputs the biggest subpart of the tentative execution sequence,
assuming that a legal execution is usually a repeating concatenation of some “default”
sequences, that we call iterations. This mechanism is also proven to be as sound and
transparent as any other existing mechanism. Iterative Suppression automata make it
possible to distinguish between different types of enforcement for the same security prop-
erty. When proposing the construction, we use our assumption that compliant executions
7
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Table 1.1: Properties of enforcement mechanism.
Name Pre-Condition Post-Condition
Soundness for every trace the output is always some
valid trace
Transparency if input is a valid trace output is the same valid trace
Predictability if input is within δ
from a valid trace
output is within ε from the same valid
trace
consist of iterations and prove that Iterative Suppression automata are capable of enforc-
ing a new class of security properties, called iterative properties. By this contribution we
propose two solutions to Issue 2.
We have established the relations between iterative properties and safety, liveness and
renewal properties. We show our results in Figure 1.2 and discuss it in more details in
the thesis. This work has led to the following conference and journal publications:
• N. Bielova, F. Massacci, and Andrea Micheletti. Towards practical enforcement
theories. In Proceedings of The 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems,
volume 5838 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 239-254. Springer-Verlag
Heidelberg, 2009. [17]
• N. Bielova and F. Massacci. Iterative enforcement by suppression: Towards practical
enforcement theories. Journal of Computer Security, 2011. To appear. [15]
1.3.3 Predictability
We address Issue 3 and argue that what distinguishes enforcement mechanisms is not what
happens when the executions comply with the policy (because nothing should happen
according to transparency), but what happens when they are not compliant. We propose
a notion of predictability that puts a restriction on enforcement mechanisms so that they
should not change the non-compliant executions in an arbitrary way.
The idea behind this new notion is defined in the spirit of continuity in real-functions.
In Table 1.1 we show a comparison of this new notion with soundness and transparency.
This work has led to the following publication:
• N. Bielova and F. Massacci. Predictability of enforcement. In Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems 2011, volume
6542 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 73-86. Springer-Verlag, 2011. [16]
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Figure 1.3: Original approach and a novel approach to construction of enforcement mech-
anisms.
1.3.4 Error-toleration
We build upon the works of automatic policy generation and runtime enforcement to
propose a semi-automatic way to generate enforcement mechanisms that can tolerate up
to k errors, given a “default” workflow and a specification of a simple list of errors and
possibly their corrections. In this way we address Issue 4.
We have proposed an algorithm to construct a particular kind of edit automata that
perform this transformation in a well-defined way. This mechanism extends the classical
default-deny policy, considering the type and number of deviations from the policy that
the edit automaton can allow or amend. Differently from original approach, where the
runtime enforcer is constructed from the given security policy, we propose a novel approach
to build a runtime enforces that tolerates up to k deviations. We present the difference
between the approaches in Figure 1.3. This work has led to the following international
conference publication:
• N. Bielova and F. Massacci. Computer-aided generation of enforcement mechanisms
for error-tolerant policies. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Policies
for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY’11), IEEE Computer Society Press,
2011. [13]
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1.3.5 Other Contributions
Besides the contributions described in this thesis, the author of the thesis contributed to
several other research results during her PhD studies:
Implementation and evaluation of Security-By-Contract In the Security-by-
Contract framework the code of the third-party application carries with itself the contract
that describes the security relevant behavior of the application; the security policy of the
platform is deployed on the mobile device.
We have implemented the contract-policy matching, which is one of the key steps
of the overall Security-by-contract framework. Contracts and policies are specified in
ConSpec [1]. The first description of the implementation appeared in [9], with more
results on testing in [18]. The major result is published in [11].
Reactive non-interference for a Browser Model We have worked on enforcing
non-interference in the model of the web browser called Featherweight Firefox [19]. Taking
the notion of reactive non-interference[20] specifically designed for the models of the web
browsers, we developed a new enforcement mechanism [10] based on the idea of secure
multi-execution [30].
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis consists of the following chapters:
Chapter 2 surveys the related work in theoretical aspects of runtime monitoring and
enforcement of security policies.
Chapter 3 introduces the gap found in the theory of runtime enforcement between the
security policies and their corresponding enforcement mechanisms. The main issues
that will be solved in this thesis are introduced. While defining the problem, we
present several running examples that will be used in the other Chapters of this
thesis.
Chapter 4 presents the relation among different types of security policies and establishes
a new classification of enforcement mechanisms. This classification is useful to define
a relation between two enforcement mechanisms that enforce the same security
policy in different ways.
Chapter 5 provides two main constructions of enforcement mechanisms given a security
policy. Longest-valid-prefix automaton outputs the longest valid prefix of the given
10
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system execution and Iterative Suppression automaton suppresses the illegal parts
of the execution. We also discuss how the enforcement is done for the running
examples defined in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 introduces a new notion of predictability that defines how the enforcement
mechanism should behave when the system executions do not comply with the given
policy. This Chapter also presents a construction of a new runtime enforcement
mechanism that can tolerate a number of insignificant errors.
Chapter 7 presents a concluding discussion.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter presents the state of the art techniques for runtime enforcement of
security policies. We describe here two main types of enforcement mechanisms:
first type are only able to recognize whether the system execution satisfies the
desired policy (sequence recognizers) and second type are also able to transform
the system executions at runtime (sequence transformers).
2.1 Systems, Policies and Properties
At the highest level of abstraction we will model the system execution with traces, where
a trace is a sequence of actions emitted by the execution. Usually in the state of the
art literature the executing system being monitored is called the target. The targets can
be objects, processes, subsystems or entire systems. The actions being monitored are
execution steps of the target that may range from low level operations (such as memory
access actions) to high level operations (such as method calls).
The security policy defines expected (or correct according to some security concerns)
behavior of the target and is usually represented in terms of set of possible execution traces
of the target. In order to ensure that the target behaves according to the security policy,
the runtime enforcement mechanism is deployed. It monitors the target execution and
enforces the security policy by terminating or modifying the original executions when they
violate the security policy. Originally, runtime monitor was named Execution Monitor
(EM) by Schneider [59].
A security policy defines an expected behavior of the target. As it was originally
proposed by Schneider [59], security policy is specified as a predicate P on sets of (finite-
or infinite-length) execution sequences. A target satisfies security policy P if and only if
13
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the set of all its execution sequences satisfies this policy.
As it is defined by Schneider [59] and refined by Ligatti et al [51], security properties
are a strict subset of security policies and they are distinguished as follows. A security
policy P is a property if there exists a characteristic predicate P̂ over individual execution
sequences. Then whenever a security policy P holds for a set of execution sequences, its
corresponding predicate P̂ holds for every sequence in that set.
Not every security policy is a security property. Since the property is only defined
in terms of single execution sequences, it cannot specify the relations between different
sequences. For example, it is a known fact that an information flow policy is not a security
property since it is defined in terms of sets of target execution sequences and relations
between them.
In the state of the art there are several classes of security properties. The property
describing behavior such as ”nothing bad ever happens” is called safety property [2, 49].
Safety means that whenever an execution sequence is valid, all its prefixes are valid as
well. More intuitively, safety means that when a violation happens (meaning a sequence
is invalid), there is no way to remediate it (there is no suffix that can make it valid again).
Additionally to safety, there is another class of properties called liveness [2]. These
properties describe the behavior such as ”something good eventually happens during any
execution”. In other words, this means that any finite execution sequence has a valid
continuation.
Not all the properties are pure safety or pure liveness. Some properties may allow an
execution sequence to alternate between satisfying and violating the property. As it was
shown by Alpern and Schneider [3], all the properties can be described as a combination
of safety and liveness.
When analyzing the enforcement capabilities of different mechanisms, Ligatti et al. [51]
defined a new class of properties, called infinite renewal properties. According to this
property, every valid infinite-length sequence has infinitely many valid prefixes, and every
invalid infinite-length sequence has only a finite number of valid prefixes. For example, let
τ range over finite sequences of legal transactions. Then a transaction policy accepting
τ∞ is a renewal property: any valid infinite-length sequence satisfying the transaction
policy τ∞ has infinitely many valid prefixes of the form τ ∗. Any invalid infinite-length
sequence that does not satisfy the transaction policy is of the form τ ∗;σ, where σ is not
a prefix of τ , which means that this sequence has only a finite number of valid prefixes.
Given this classification of security properties, different authors started to propose
enforcement mechanisms that are capable of enforcing particular types of properties.
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2.1.1 Hyperproperties
Later Clarkson and Schneider [28] introduced hyperproperties that are sets of properties, or
sets of sets of execution traces. Hence, hyperpoperties are able to describe security policies
that are not properties, such as information-flow policies. The authors also propose a
notion of hypersafety and hyperliveness, that are also hyperproperties and are specified in
a similar way as safety and liveness, with the only difference that instead of traces they use
sets of traces. Interestingly, the authors generalize the result of Alpern and Schneider [2]
that every security property is the intersection of safety property and liveness property.
Clarckson and Schnieder prove that every hyperproperty is the intersection of hypersafety
and hyperliveness.
Another interesting result from [28] is that noninterference, as defined by Goguen and
Meseguer [41], can be written as a particular type of hypersafety called k-safety hyperprop-
erty. The idea behind k-safety is that the “bad thing” defining that the continuations of
system executions will not satisfy this hyperproperty, never involves more than k traces.
Since Goguen and Meseguer’s definition of noninterference compares two traces, it is a
2-safety hyperproperty. In [28] the authors also suggest a relatively complete verification
technique for k-safety hyperproperties.
The hyperproperties, especially hypersafety and k-safety hyperproperty, are very in-
teresting for investigation of their enforcement techniques, however this thesis is covers
the area of enforcement for security properties that can be specified with a single predicate
on executions traces.
2.2 Runtime Enforcement Mechanisms as Sequence
Recognizers
The first idea of modeling an enforcement mechanism for security properties belongs to
Schneider who proposed to think about runtime monitors as sequence recognizers.
2.2.1 Security Automata
Schneider introduced the notion of enforceable security policies and Execution Monitoring
(EM) in 2000 [59]. He was the first proposing the notion of security properties and
trying to analyze security policies enforceable by execution monitoring. In his paper,
Schneider fairly claims that a security policy must be a property in order for a policy to
have an enforcement mechanism is EM. This statement is correct since a runtime monitor
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makes decision about a single execution at runtime and is incapable of comparing different
executions between themselves. Having that in mind, all the follow-up work that has been
done in the area discusses only runtime enforcement mechanisms for security properties.
Also, the author tried to restrict the obtained result stating that “If the set of exe-
cutions for a security policy P is not a safety property, then an enforcement mechanism
from EM does not exist for P .” This statement, however, is not true. The problem
with this statement is that the terms used in it do not correspond to the notions that
the author obviously had in mind. By Execution Monitors the author means sequence
recognizers that can only conclude whether the execution satisfies the property or not.
These mechanisms have the power of accepting a single action at runtime or terminate
the whole execution. Having that in mind, the statement becomes true, hence one could
rewrite it as “If the set of executions for a security policy P is not a safety property, then
an enforcement mechanism modeled as sequence recognizer does not exist for P .”
Schneider proposed a first runtime enforcement mechanism modeled as sequence rec-
ognizer, called Security Automata (SA). It monitors the execution of the target and halts
it as soon as it violates the property. In this way the proposed mechanism naturally
enforces safety properties.
2.2.2 Shallow History Automata
Fong [38] provided a new approach to classify enforceable security properties. First, he
proposed to investigate an open question raised by Bauer et. al in [6]: whether it is possible
to further classify the space of EM-enforceable policies by constraining the capabilities of
the execution monitor.
Fong successfully found the way to prove that this is possible by classifying the space
of EM-enforceable policies according to the information consumed by an execution mon-
itor. He proposed a new mechanism called Shallow-History automata (SHA) that keeps
as a history the access control events occurred in the past, and does not contain any in-
formation about the order of their arrival. By doing so, Fong proved that SHA is strictly
less expressive than SA.
To show the practicality of his mechanism, Fong showed how some well known security
policies such as Chinese wall policy [21], low-water-mark policy [8] or one-out-of-k autho-
rization policy [31] can be enforced by SHA. Later he proved that the class of policies
enforceable by SHA is less expressive than the general class of EM-enforceable policies.
Fong proposed to use the generalization of his technique to define a lattice of security
policy classes, in which member classes are ordered by the amount of information that
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must be tracked by an execution monitor. However, this classification applies only to
safety properties.
2.2.3 Computational power of Execution Recognizers
Viswanathan, Kim et al. [48, 62] decided to investigate the computational power of run-
time monitoring mechanisms, in particular they limited their work on execution recogniz-
ers enforcing safety properties in finite time. They introduced computability constraints
and showed that the monitors recognizing invalid executions enforce the set of computable
safety properties.
Hamlen et al. [45] revised the classifications given by Schneider [59] taking into account
work done by Viswanathan and Kim et al. In order to analyze the computational power
of runtime enforcement mechanisms, Hamlen et al. first give a set of assumptions that are
relevant for all the preceding and subsequent works on runtime monitors. In particular,
since runtime enforcers should present security policy violations before they occur, they
always must have a power of predicting target’s behavior on any given input. For example,
a security automaton must be able to look ahead at least one computational step in order
to intercept bad events before they occur.
They also analyzed the properties that can be enforced by static analysis and program
rewriting. This taxonomy leads to a more accurate characterization of enforceable security
policies.
2.3 Runtime Enforcement Mechanisms as Sequence
Transformers
2.3.1 Edit Automata
Later Ligatti, Bauer, and Walker [7, 51] have introduced edit automata, a new mechanism
that is capable of enforcing a class of security properties strictly bigger than a class
of safety properties. The authors could achieve such a result because, differently from
Schneider that considers runtime enforcement mechanisms as sequence recognizers, they
propose to view them as sequence transformers.
Remark 2.3.1 Notice that before appearance of runtime enforcement mechanisms as ex-
ecution transformers, runtime enforcement was often done by runtime monitoring. In
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other words, monitors were considered ”enforcers” as they were able to observe the sys-
tem executions and halt them as soon as they violate the given security properties. With
the appearance of sequence transformer techniques, runtime monitoring and runtime en-
forcement are two distinctive notions.
Edit automata was a first enforcement technique that proposed not only to monitor and
halt the system executions but also to transform them: edit automata are able to insert
new actions to the execution of suppress them (with a possibility to memorize them for
later use). Having this power of modifying program actions at run time, edit automata are
provably more powerful than security automata and enforce a class of renewal properties
that is shown to be strictly bigger than the class of safety properties.
It was proved in [51] that every decidable renewal property can be enforced by a kind of
edit automaton that outputs the longest legal prefix of the input. The renewal property,
similar to the liveness property, implicitly assumes that if an infinite sequence is legal
then for every prefix of this sequence the liveness holds, or “nothing irremediably bad
happens in any finite prefix”. It is obviously implied by the fact that an infinite-length
legal execution must have an infinite number of legal prefixes. Therefore if an infinite-
length execution has something irremediably bad happened in a finite prefix, then the
number of valid prefixes is finite, and hence this execution is invalid.
2.3.2 Bounded History Automata
The next attempt to characterize the security policies enforceable by runtime monitors
depending on the information stored in the memory of the monitor was done by Talhi et
al. [61]. They proposed Bounded history automata (BHA) that bounds the automata by
the limited history. As such, they distinguish two subclasses of BHA: bounded security
automata (BSA) and bounded edit automata (BEA). We will cover the latter case here,
since it is a sequence transformer.
The states of BEA represent a bounded history of valid execution sequences: more
concretely, every state contains a prefix of the execution sequence already accepted by the
automaton and a suffix that is currently suppressed. When a maximum size of history is k,
respected BEA is called k-BEA, and the enforcement power of Bounded Edit Automata
is bounded by this number. The authors have also proved that for k, k′ ∈ N, when
k < k′ : k′-BEA are more powerful than k-BEA.
Chabot et al. [23] proposed to synthesize security automata from the security proper-
ties expressed as Rabin automata. They provide a construction from safety properties in
general case and more than safety in case when additional information about the program
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is obtained by a static analysis. However, the comparison of enforceable properties with
other (renewal, liveness) properties is left aside.
An interesting direction was also taken by Khoury and Tawbi [47, 46]. The authors
proposed to define an equivalence relation between the original execution of the target and
the result of the transformation of that execution by the enforcement mechanism. Their
definition of equivalence relation is very generic and cannot guide the user to synthesize
better enforcement mechanism.
2.3.3 Synthesis of Enforcement Monitors
Another line of work is concerned the synthesis of runtime enforcement monitors. A
great part of the work in this direction is done by Martinelli and Matteucci [54]. They
have shown how to synthesize such execution monitors. Given the system and a security
policy represented as a µ-calculus formula the user can choose the controller operator
(truncation, suppression, insertion or edit automata). Then he can generate a program
controller that will restrict the behavior of the system to those specified by the formula. In
a later work [55] the authors generalize the approach in the context of real-time systems.
2.3.4 Generic Enforcement Monitors
Falcone et al. proposed a technique to produce an enforcement monitor given a security
property specified as Streett automaton [34, 35]. Parameterizing this automaton, the
authors specify four different types of security properties according to safety-progress (SP)
classification of properties [25, 24]: safety, guarantee, response and persistence. They give
informal definition of these properties[35]:
• safety properties are the properties for which whenever a sequence satis-
fies a property, all its prefixes satisfy this property.
• guarantee properties are the properties for which whenever a sequence
satisfies a property, there are some prefixes (at least one) satisfying this
property.
• response properties are the properties for which whenever a sequence
satisfies a property, an infinite number of its prefixes satisfy this property.
• persistence properties are the properties for which whenever a sequence
satisfies a property, all its prefixes continuously satisfy this property from
a certain point.
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As we can see, safety properties are exactly those that we described earlier in Sec-
tion 2.1. Since response property guarantees that whenever a sequence is valid, it should
have an infinite number of valid prefixes, we can conclude that response property coin-
cides with the renewal property. This is our observation, however the authors of the paper
did not explicitly compare their properties with renewal and liveness properties. We will
not try to make this comparison but rather pay our attention to the construction of the
enforcement mechanism and its way to enforce given properties.
The safety-, guarantee-, and response-transformations describe the semantics of the
enforcement mechanisms. All these mechanisms are sequence transformers that always
output the longest valid prefix of the original execution sequence. In the Chapter 4 we will
discuss the relation between these kinds of enforcement mechanisms and other sequence
transformers.
In their next work [36] the authors propose an upper-bound of the set of enforce-
able properties. They get this bound by characterizing properties independently from
the enforcement mechanisms that only should comply with soundness and transparency.
However, the authors define a property to be enforceable only if each incorrect infinite
sequence has a finite number of correct prefixes, and this is a definition of renewal property.
2.3.5 Enforcement Mechanisms for Usage Control
Pretschner et. al. [57] have provided a model of consumer-side enforcement mechanisms
for distributed usage control. This model can be used to formally check if a set of mecha-
nisms is able to enforce a given obligation and to check interference of mechanisms. The
four classes of mechanisms were presented: inhibition, delay, modification and execution.
Inhibition prevents specific events from happening, which is similar to the suppression op-
eration of edit automata. Delay mechanism postpones the decision about the sequence of
events for a fixed number of steps. Modification mechanism is able to make a replacement
of events, which is similar to two steps of an edit automaton: suppression and insertion.
The difference is that the modification mechanism is claimed to be able to cater for con-
current events by replacing one event by the set of events. Execution mechanisms can
add some events to the execution so that the resulting execution will satisfy the given
policy. The ability of adding events is similar to the insertion operation of edit automaton.
Hence, they preserve the notion of soundness. However it is not clear how the property
of transparency can be checked. The execution mechanism can add arbitrary events, as
long as respective properties are not violated. The authors require the effect of applying
their mechanisms to be minimal.
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2.3.6 A (hidden) assumption
Runtime enforcement mechanisms as sequence transformers (including those that will
be presented in this thesis) use one important assumption that all the actions can be
suppressed or modified at runtime. In practice this is not always possible.
Let us consider a system that executes actions that depend on the results of previous
actions. For example, we can consider a Service-oriented architecture (SOA) where ser-
vices are exchanging messages, for example one service can invoke another service. All the
intercommunications between the services are happening through the Enterprise Service
Bus (ESB) [26].
In order to enforce some security policies in SOA, an enforcement mechanism is needed
to intercept the messages and decide whether the behavior of the system complies with the
security policies. One way to implement such an enforcement mechanism is xESB [40],
an enhanced version of an ESB. xESB intercepts the messages and makes a decision,
whether to accept, delay or modify the messages depending on the security policy. Let
us show one motivating example of security policy from the original paper [40], where a
hypothetical company “Foo.uk”, providing VoIP-based services using a communication
platform implemented as a SOA is using an ESB.
Example 2.3.1 Process collect calls only after destination has agreed to pay. The VoIP
destination must have accepted to pay for the call before replying to collect call request.
The relevant messages on ESB for this policy are:
• ip for invocation of payment
• rp for positive response on payment
• ic for invocation of the collect call
• rc for positive response of the collect call
The policy specifies that these messages are allowed to be sent in a particular order,
that can be described as a regular expression (ip, rp, ic, rc)∗ (only after the destination gave
a positive response on payment, the collect call can be invoked). This particular scenario
requires that all invocation messages are accepted by the enforcement mechanism because
if the enforcement mechanism blocks them, the response to those invokations will never
arrive. Generally speaking, whenever an acceptance of some messages depends on the
acceptance of previous messages, the policy has the form (in the example above n=2):
(i1, r1), (i2, r2), . . . , (in, rn)
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Then the enforcement mechanism should accept all sequences of messages the form
(i1, r1), (i2, r2) . . . , ij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n
However, this output does not satisfy the security policy being enforced, which contradicts
the meaning of enforcement.
In this thesis we make an assumption that holds for all the other state-of-the-art
runtime enforcement mechanisms mentioned above:
Assumption 1 All the actions intercepted by the enforcement mechanism can be sup-
pressed or modified, and this will not influence the other actions emitted by the system
2.4 Runtime Enforcement Mechanisms for Informa-
tion Flow Security
There is a large body of related work on information flow security enforcement mecha-
nisms. There are two major approaches to information flow security enforcement: static
techniques and dynamic techniques. In particular, we will describe the main approaches
to enforcement of a particular information flow security policy, called noninterference.
Noninterference for programs means that a variation of confidential (high) input does not
cause a variation of public (low) outputs.
2.4.1 Static Information Flow Analysis
Sabelfeld and Myers [58] survey static techniques for information flow enforcement. One of
the main static techniques is to build a security type system for a particular programming
language. A security type system is a set of typing rules that describe what security
type is assigned to a program. Whenever a given program is typable with respect to
this security type system, the program is proven to be noninterferent. Another static
technique is based on programming language semantics. It defines relations on the states
of the program execution with respect to the security level: at high security level all the
variables are visible to an observer of program execution, and at low security level only low
(public) variables are visible to an observer. Noninterference defines that whenever two
program states agree on low level variables (are not distinguished by a low level observer),
then the outputs of this program are also not distinguishable by a low level observer.
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2.4.2 Dynamic Information Flow Analysis
Static analysis techniques have one major drawback: they accept the program only if all
its executions ensure noninterference. In this thesis we are more interesred in dynamic
techniques, since runtime enforcement mechanisms are dynamic and that should obey
similar formal properties.
Automata-based Condentiality Monitoring Work by Le Guernic et al. [44, 43]
proposes a monitor that analyses only actual executions of the program. The model
of a monitor is an automaton that produces outputs on an input sequence formed by
program execution. This automaton is a kind of edit automaton which is able to enforce
non-interference of a program with high and low program variables. The states of this
automaton contain information about variables that may have been influenced by the
initial values of high variables and tracks variety in the context of the execution.
Secure multi-execution Another novel dynamic technique is secure multi-execution
proposed by Devriese and Piessens [30]. This enforcement method is able to enforce non-
interference for a security lattice containing any amount of security levels. The idea of
this technique is to execute the original program one time per each security level, while
filtering the inputs and outputs of the program in a particular way such that no higher
inputs can actually flow into lower outputs.
Formal Properties Similar to the fact that an edit automaton can potentially enforce
the same security property in different ways, different dynamic techniques can enforce
non-interference in different ways as well. To make a brief discussion, we compare the
techniques by Le Guernic et al. and Devriese and Piessens. Formally, we can compare
the properties of these mechanisms that were proven in the corresponding papers.
Both of the approaches are proven to be sound, meaning that the output of the two
mechanisms form only non-interferent executions. Transparency is a more interesting no-
tion: it means that if the original program execution is non-interferent, then after applying
enforcement techniques, the resulting execution is preserved. The problem of noninter-
ference is neither dynamically nor statically decidable. Hence, there is no enforcement
mechanism that is transparent, a weaker notion of precision can be proven for mechanisms
enforcing noninterference.
Le Guernic et al. [44, 43] proposed a pseudo-trasparency, using a security type system
similar to the one of Volpano et al. [63]. The executions of type-safe programs are not
modified by the monitoring mechanism, but moreover, other non-interferent executions
are not modified by the monitoring mechanism, even though it was not proven formally.
Here we quote Le Guernic [43]:
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To show that the inclusion is strict, consider the following program: x := h; x
:=0; output x. h is the only secret input. Every execution is noninterfering.
But as the type system is flow insensitive, this program is ill-typed. However,
the monitoring mechanism does not interfere with the outputs of this program
while still guaranteeing that any monitored execution is noninterfering.
Devriese and Piessens [30] have proven a more interesting result: their enforcement tech-
nique is precise in the sense that terminating runs of every termination-sensitive noninter-
ferent program is not modified by an enforcement mechanism. The authors claim that the
set of termination-sensitive noninterferent programs strictly includes all programs which
are type-safe according to the type system by Volpano et al. [63].
Practically speaking, the monitoring mechanism by Le Guernic et al. seem to be more
efficient in practice since it evaluates only one execution at time, while the technique
by Devriese and Piessens uses several executions of the program together. On the other
hand, the monitoring mechanism operates only with two security levels, while secure
multi-execution can handle an arbitrary number of security levels and hence, it is possible
that two-execution of the original program can have comparable performance with respect
to the monitor of Le Guernic et al.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we have described several types of runtime enforcement mechanisms: exe-
cution sequence recognizers are able only to accept of reject the execution sequence based
on the security policy they are enforcing, hence they are only able to halt the execution;
execution sequence transformers are more powerful enforcement mechanisms because they
are able not only halt, but also modify the tentative execution at runtime. However, these
mechanisms make one important and hidden assumption about the original system (see
Assumption 1) that all the actions of the system can be suppressed or modified and this
does not influence the rest of the system execution.
Runtime enforcement mechanisms as execution transformers are also capable of enforc-
ing more complex security policies, like information flow security policy. In this chapter
we also discuss the state of the art literature on the dynamic techniques for information
flow analysis.
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Concrete Problems of Runtime
Enforcement
In this chapter we discuss the gap that we found in the theory of security policy
enforcement mechanisms. We will present several examples of security policies
and describe how existing mechanisms can enforce them at runtime.
Different security properties can and should be enforced in different ways. As we know
from the state-of-the-art (see Chapter 2), safety property (“nothing bad ever happens”)
can be enforced by a security automaton, which is a sequence recognizer. This property
cannot be enforced in any other better way, since whenever the execution sequence is
invalid, it means that all its continuations are invalid as well. So halting the execution as
soon as it violates the property is the best way to enforce safety properties.
As we have also discussed in the state-of-the-art, sequence transformers are able to
enforce more than safety properties. In particular, edit automata was proven to be able
to enforce renewal properties by modification of the execution sequences. In this case it is
much more interesting to investigate how exactly the property can be enforced, in other
words, what kind of modification should be made to the original execution sequence.
3.1 A Simple Example from the Literature
We use an example from [7] to show the existence of the problem that has not been
addressed by other authors.
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3.1.1 Market Policy
Example 3.1.1 (Verbatim from [7]) To make our example more concrete,
we will model a simple market system with two main actions, take(n) and
pay(n), which represent acquisition of n apples and the corresponding pay-
ment. We let a range over all the actions that might occur in the system (such
as take, pay, window-shop, browse, etc.). Our policy is that every time an
agent takes n apples it must pay for those apples. Payments may come before
acquisition or vice versa, and take(n); pay(n) is semantically equivalent to
pay(n); take(n). The edit automaton enforces the atomicity of this trans-
action by emitting take(n); pay(n) only when the transaction completes. If
payment is made first, the automaton allows clients to perform other actions
such as browse before committing (the take-pay transaction appears atom-
ically after all such intermediary actions). On the other hand, if apples are
taken and not paid for immediately, we issue a warning and abort the trans-
action. Consistency is ensured by remembering the number of apples taken or
the size of the prepayment in the state of the machine. Once acquisition and
payment occur, the sale is final and there are no refunds (durability).
3.1.2 Possible Executions
Looking at the example in English we propose several execution sequences in Table 3.1:
some satisfy the policy and some do not. When the sequence is not allowed by the policy,
the enforcement mechanism should change the sequence in such a way that it becomes
legal. In this table we partition the sequences in several groups. In the group “Temporarily
illegal sequences that can become good”, sequences are not yet finished so that we cannot
define whether they are legal (which means satisfy the policy from Example 3.1.1) or not,
because they could become good later on. For example, in sequence 1 the take(1) action
can be followed by a pay(1) action that can make the whole sequence legal; on the other
hand it can be followed by browse that will make the sequence illegal.
The group “Legal sequences” contains sequences that satisfy the policy, for example
take(1); pay(1).
The initially illegal sequences are divided into two groups. The first group contains
the sequences with an initially bad prefix but the suffix can become legal later. For
example, sequence 6 has an illegal prefix take(1) browse, however the suffix pay(2)
can be extended to legal sequence since it can be a beginning of sequence 5: pay(2);
take(2). The second group contains sequences that have an illegal prefix followed by a
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Table 3.1: Sequences of actions for market policy
Temporarily illegal sequences that can become good
No Sequence of actions Expected output
1 take(1) ·
2 pay(2) ·
3 pay(2); browse browse
Legal sequences
No Sequence of actions Expected output
4 take(1); pay(1) take(1); pay(1)
5 pay(2); take(2) pay(2); take(2)
Initially illegal sequences, but a later suffix can become good
No Sequence of actions Expected output
6 take(1); browse; pay(2) warning
7 take(1); pay(2) warning
Initially illegal sequences with legal continuation
No Sequence of actions Expected output
8 take(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) warning; browse; pay(2); take(2)
9 take(1); pay(2); take(2) pay(2); take(2)
10 pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) browse; pay(2); take(2)
legal continuation, such as sequence 8: it has an illegal prefix take(1); browse, but its
suffix is a legal (sequence 5).
There are some other sequences like pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2); take(1) that
we could not add to neither of the groups. This happens because the text leaves open a
number of interpretations. It is clear that good sequences must have a pair of take(n)
and pay(n) as the text implies, but it is not clear whether we allow interleaving of pay(n)
and pay(m). The text seems to imply that this is not possible.
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3.1.3 Problems in Enforcement
The original edit automaton proposed in Figure 2 of [7] is shown in this thesis in Figure 3.1.
The graphical notation used in this figure is the same as in [7] with only one addition: for
readability we underline the output at the transition. The nodes in the picture represent
the automaton states and the arcs represent the transitions. The action that is above the
arc defines an input action. Output actions are underlined and placed below the arcs.
Arcs with no underlined sequence represent transitions where there is no output. If there
is no transition for the given state and action, then the automaton halts.
Let us look at sequence 4 from the Table 3.1: take(1); pay(1). The edit automaton
starts in the initial state q0. When it reads the first action take(1), it moves to the
corresponding state −n and waits for the next input action to arrive. When the action
pay(1) arrives, the automaton moves back to the state q0 while outputting the take(1);
pay(1) sequence (as indicated at the output of the arc from −n to q0).
The policy given in Example 3.1.1 can be enforced by edit automata in different ways.
One of the notions that guarantees enforcement of the policy is called effective=enforcement.
This notion ensures that all legal sequences are not changed by the edit automaton, while
all illegal sequences are changed to some legal sequences or to empty sequences. The
automaton in Figure 3.1 provides effective=enforcement of the given policy since it does
not change the legal sequences and always changes illegal sequences to some legal ones. In
the following, we will use the predicate called property that decides whether the sequence
is legal or not.
Theorem 8 [7] says that any renewal property can be effectively=enforced by an edit
automaton. The proof of this theorem presents a construction of an edit automaton from
a given renewal property. We briefly sketch the main idea of the construction from the
proof of Theorem 8 [7] in the following steps:
• States of the edit automaton contain two finite sequences: sequence of actions seen
so far and the sequence of actions that were suppressed
• Consider processing a new input action:
– in case the sequence seen so far becomes valid, the automaton inserts the
suppressed sequence followed by a new input.
– in case the sequence seen so far does not become valid, the automaton sup-
presses the current input action and adds it to the suppressed sequence in the
next state.
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This edit automaton was originally presented in Figure 2 of [7] and it is effectively=enforcing the market
policy.
Figure 3.1: Edit automaton verbatim from [7].
This edit automaton is constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 [7]. It is easy to see that this
automaton effectively=enforces the market policy, but has an infinite number of states and provides
different kind of enforcement for the same policy.
Figure 3.2: Edit automaton reconstructed by the proof of Theorem 8 from [7].
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Table 3.2: Difference in output for edit automata
No Input Output
Edit automaton from Fig-
ure 2 of [7]
Constructed edit
automaton by
Theorem 8 [7]
4 take(1); pay(1) take(1); pay(1) take(1); pay(1)
6 take(1); browse; pay(2) warning ·
8 take(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) warning; pay(2); take(2) ·
9 take(1); pay(2); take(2) warning ·
10 pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) browse ·
We will give a more detailed construction verbatim from the proof of Theorem 8 [7]
in Section 4.3.
For sake of simplicity, we show a constructed edit automaton only partially, for the set
of actions {take(1), take(2), pay(1), pay(2), browse}. Here we use a browse action
just to present some other actions that the user can do after paying before taking the
apples. According to the text, an action warning is considered to be an output action in
the edit automaton in Figure 2 of [7] (see Figure 3.1). As the cardinality of input language
is 5, every state will have five outcoming arcs for all possible actions. We will present
here only some of them in order to let the reader see the output sequences for particular
input sequences. In Figure 3.2 we follow the construction from the proof of Theorem 8 in
order to build the edit automaton.
The edit automaton from Figure 2 of the original paper (Figure 3.1) and the one
constructed by the proof of Theorem 8 of the same paper (Figure 3.2) actually produce
different output for the same input. In Table 3.2 we show some cases of input and output
of both automata.
Sequence 4 is legal, hence it is not changed by both automata. Sequence 6 has illegal
prefix and not yet legal suffix, hence both automata halt (let us ignore the warning action
since it can be easily added to the construction from Theorem 8). However, for other bad
sequences that have different nature, the automata behave differently. The output set
of the automaton from Figure 2 of [7] is larger than the output of the automaton from
Theorem 8 [7].
The ”strange” behavior begins when we take the sequences from the group “Initially
illegal sequences with legal continuation”, like sequence 8. The edit automaton from
Figure 2 of [7] can skip the illegal prefix take(1); browse and output the legal suffix
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Grey area is the area of invalid traces, white area shows valid traces. Edit automaton originally from
Figure 2 [7] (that we show in Figure 3.1) and edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem
8 from the same paper produce different output for the same invalid execution sequences.
Figure 3.3: Relation between input and output for edit automaton originally from Figure
2 [7] and Theorem 8 [7].
pay(2); take(2). However, the automaton from Theorem 8 halts as soon as an illegal
prefix does not have a legal continuation. In case of sequences 9 and 10 both automata
produce a strange output in a sense that the agent has paid but never got any apple.
Analyzing Table 3.2, we find out that the transformed sequences of actions are not
always the ones expected from the edit automaton. So the question arises: Why the
output is predictable in some cases and unpredictable in the others? The answer to this
question is:
1. When the input sequence is legal both edit automata produce the expected output
(e.g. sequence 4).
2. When the sequence is illegal the output of both edit automata is unexpected and
potentially different for each automaton.
3. The edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 [7] is a very
particular kind of the edit automaton.
In Figure 3.3, we show the relation between input and output for edit automaton from
Figure 2 of [7] and edit automata from Theorem 8 [7] with respect to the “good” and
“bad” traces. By 4;8 we mean the concatenation of the sequence 4 with the sequence 8.
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By 8out we mean an output sequence of Figure 2 automaton when processing sequence 8
as input. It is shown in Table 3.2.
As we can see, both automata from Figure 2 of [7] and Theorem 8 [7] are edit automata,
and they both effectively=enforce the market policy. Why these two edit automata are
producing different outputs?
We shall investigate this question in this thesis and by doing so we will solve Issue 1.
We will analyze different classes of edit automata that explain the behavior of the edit au-
tomata from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and formally define relation between them in Section 4.3.
Another question is How to construct a runtime enforcement mechanism that enforces
given security policy in a desirable way?
We raise this question because as we have seen on the example of market policy,
outputting the longest valid prefix is not always the best way of enforcing the security
property. We shall address this question to solve Issue 2.
Before proceeding to the classification and rigorous formal analysis of security proper-
ties and their enforcement in later chapter, let us present the main example from industry
that we will use in this thesis.
3.2 A Case Study from Industry
This example also represents a property that is neither pure safety, nor liveness and allows
sequences to alternate between being valid and invalid.
3.2.1 Drug Dispensation Process
We propose an example based on a healthcare process of drug dispensation. In Italy
hospitals accredited with the Public National Health Service are in charge of administering
drugs and providing diagnostic services to patients. Usually in these (public or private)
hospitals there is a generic dispensation process description that allows hospitals to refund
the drugs administered and/or supplied in the hospitals’ outpatient departments to the
patients that are not hospitalized. In particular, there is a process called File F that
allows refunding of the drugs for specific critical and chronic diseases. This refunding is
usually done by the public authority. As another example, if the patient is using a specific
drug for the research program purposes (i.e. the patient has been enrolled for the clinical
trial for the testing of that drug) then the reimbursement should be done by the clinical
trial funds.
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Drug dispensation process is a high level business process. It involves human partici-
pants as well as IT technologies. Some of contained tasks are completely human activities
without any interaction with IT system (e.g. all patients tasks, or delivering drugs from
stock to patient (physically) by doctor or nurse). Hence, some of the activities may be
done in a different way than described in the default process, and we will make a precise
distinction between the actual execution of the process and the official default process.
The described model of drug dispensation assures that if all the activities adhere to it,
they comply with the encoded rules (e.g. File F process) and the drugs will be refunded.
In Figure 3.4 we present a simplified version of the BPMN (Business Process Model
Notation) diagram of drug dispensation process.1. We show the whole drug selection
process in the upper part of the figure and emphasize its drug selection subprocess in the
lower part of the figure. We will discuss this subprocess in more details in the sequel.
The drug dispensation process starts when the Patient brings his prescription sheet
to Doctor or Nurse (we will say Doctor from here on). We will describe this process
step-by-step:
1. The first step of the process is “Retrieve Doctor’s Data”. The Doctor authenticates
himself by entering his ID. The system identifies Doctor’s operational unit and
enables Patient identification.
2. Next the Doctor runs the subprocess “Identify Patient”, we will not describe the
details of this subprocess since they are not important for this running example.
3. When Doctor made an identification, he asks the Patient whether Patient requires
anonymization of his personal health records (“Check Anonymization”).
4. The Doctor marks that it should be anonymized it if required (“Mark Anonymiza-
tion Flag”).
5. The system retrieves all necessary data for selecting the drugs for dispensation and
offers the option to select drugs to the Doctor (“Retreive Dispensation Info”).
6. “Drug Selection” is a special subprocess that we will describe in details later.
7. After drug selection the Doctor performs a number of steps. He verifies candidate
drug list (for dispensation) and continues or restarts the process of drug selection.
Then Doctor registers the dispensation request, takes the drugs physically from the
1We would like to thank ANECT (http://www.anect.com/en/) for developing original BPMN dia-
grams of the full drug dispensation process.
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The upper part of the figure shows the BPMN diagram for drug dispensation process. Subprocess “Drug
selection” represents the sequence of actions when doctor selects a drug for a patient.
Figure 3.4: BPMN diagram drug dispensation process
stock, prints dispensation sheet, brings drugs to the Patient and archives copy of
dispensation sheet, signed by Patient.
This process was implemented in the MASTER project and more details of the process
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can be found at [53].
As a running example for this thesis, we will use the drug selection subprocess. Ex-
ecution of this subprocess is repeated by the Doctor for every drug in the prescription.
We describe it step-by-step:
1. The Doctor selects one drug from the candidate drug list for his Patient (“Drug is
selected”).
2. If the drug is highly sensitive, reviewing therapeutical notes is needed (“Review
Therapeutical Notes”). In this case they will be shown to the Doctor.
3. The system checks drug’s submission to Research program and in case the drug
is registered shows the notification to the Doctor. In case Doctor receives such
notification, he should insert the research protocol number, a number of the protocol
according to which the drug can be given to the Patient (“Insert Research Protocol
Number”).
4. The Doctor performs “Insert prescription details” for the drug he selected for his
Patient.
5. The system checks drug availability in stock and eventually notifies the Doctor.
6. If the drug is not available in stock Doctor checks the physical existence in the ward
and then decides to continue or cancel the dispensation process (“Check Drugs
Physical Existence in the Ward”).
To ease the comparison with other papers on runtime enforcement [7, 61] and to the
example we have described in Section 3.1, we present the BPMN process using finite state
automaton. This representation is natural, since from a point of view of the Doctor a
workflow described above is a sequence of actions that should be performed. To simplify
the translation we assume that each choice in BPMN diagram corresponds to the action in
resulting process execution that communicates the choice, e.g., if the drug is for research
then the corresponding action is “Drug is for research”, if the drug is highly sensitive,
then an action “Therapeutical notes needed” will be shown. Not only in our example
but in many practical cases the policy is given implicitly by describing the workflow
corresponding to the legal executions, that can be repeated several times. This is precisely
the case when we represent a process description using automaton. Formal definition and
a corresponding automaton will be given later in Chapter 5.
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The security policy P described desired sequences of actions that should be done for
drug dispensation. We will use the following notations for the actions in the process:
Dis Drug is selected
Tnn Therapeutical notes needed
Rtn Review therapeutical notes
TnNn Therapeutical notes Not needed
Dr Drug is for research
Irpn Insert research protocol number
DNr Drug is Not for research
Ipd Insert prescription details
DNas Drug is Not available in the stock
Dpew Drug physically exists in the ward
Das Drug is available in the stock
The execution sequences consist of combinations of these actions, and the security
policy specifies only those sequences that do not violate the process description. To
simplify the description, Dpres is either equal to Ipd; Das or to Ipd; DNas; Dpew.
Example 3.2.1 The security policy P consists of the following traces:
SimpleRun Dis; TnNn; DNr; Dpres,
NoteRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; DNr; Dpres,
ResearchRun Dis; TnNn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
NoteResearchRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
and their closure under concatenation: for every σ, σ′ ∈ P : σ;σ′ ∈ P . Notice that an
empty trace NoRun also satisfies the policy.
3.2.2 Possible Executions
Here we present several executions of the drug selection subprocess and analyze the kind
of enforcement that the up to date techniques can propose.
Let us assume the following execution of the process, where 3 different drugs are in
the prescription list, hence the execution will consist of 3 parts, that we call an iteration,
for each drug:
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1. The first drug is selected and it is not highly sensitive, so therapeutical notes are
not needed; the drug is for research, so the Doctor inserts research protocol number;
then he inserts prescription details; and the drug is available in stock. The sequence
of actions for this iteration is: Dis; TnNn; Dr; Irpn; Ipd; Das, which is a sequence
denoted by ResearchRun, and it is compliant with to the policy P .
2. Then for the second drug: the Doctor selects it; the drug is not highly sensitive
so therapeutical notes not needed; the drug is for research but the Doctor inserts
prescription details only; the drug is available in stock. The sequence of actions for
this iteration is: Dis; TnNn; Dr; Ipd; Das, which is a sequence not accepted by the
policy P . Indeed, in this part of the process execution the drug is for research but
the research protocol number is not inserted.
3. The third part of the execution consists of actions: the Doctor selects a highly sen-
sitive drug, so therapeutical notes needed; the Doctor reviews therapeutical notes;
the drug is not for research; Doctor inserts prescription details, and the drug is
available in stock. The sequence of actions for this iteration is: Dis; Tnn; Rtn; DNr;
Ipd; Das. This iteration is denoted by NoteRun and is compliant with the policy.
Hence, this part is correct.
3.2.3 Problems in Enforcement
Let us discuss how the drug dispensation process can be enforced by existing runtime
enforcement techniques. We had a long discussion about the problems specified in this
section with the colleagues from the Hospital San Raffaele (HSR), Milan, Italy. Some
issues are discussed in a joint publication [17]2.
More than the longest valid prefix
The execution consisting of three iterations has to be changed in order to become com-
pliant. The only construction we have seen in the state-of-the-art papers is in the proof
of Theorem 8 in [7]. The idea behind this construction is to monitor the actions of the
target one by one and suppress them in case the sequence seen so far is invalid. As soon
as the target is going to execute a new action that validates the sequence seen so far,
the constructed edit automaton will insert all the suppressed actions and this new action.
2Disclaimer: The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy of the Hospital San Raffaele
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Hence, the result of this construction is an edit automaton that always outputs the longest
valid prefix of the tentative target execution.
Such edit automaton for our drug dispensation process example will suppress the
actions of the first iteration until the last action arrives, i.e. actions Dis, TnNn, Dr, Irpn
and Ipd will be suppressed. As soon as the action Das arrives, the sequence of actions
seen so far will comply with the policy P and so the edit automaton will output this
suppressed sequence that we denoted by ResearchRun. After that the automaton will
suppress the actions of the second iteration: Dis, TnNn, Dr, Ipd, Das. The automaton
is constructed in such a way that it will wait for arrival of a new action that validates
this iteration. However, such action does not exist because the doctor already made an
irremediable error: he did not insert the research protocol number (corresponding action
Irpn) when the drug is for research (action Dr happened). The third iteration, that is valid
by itself, will never be output by this automaton because it will suppress all the following
actions after the second iteration waiting for this iteration to become valid, which will
never happen.
Even if we accept the idea that an incorrect execution should be dropped, the accept-
able behavior for the administrators of the e-health system is just to drop the second part
of the execution. We are going to propose the solution to this problem in Chapter 5 and
will address in this way Issue 2.
More than effective=enforcement
Similar to drug dispensation process, italian hospitals must guarantee the compliance of
many business processes involving large amounts of money (reimbursements from public
health authorities for drugs dispensation), significant privacy concerns (drugs can be
related to HIV or other serious illnesses), major safety considerations (drugs might have
serious side-effects), and compliance with many regulations. These regulations can change
frequently and a runtime enforcement mechanism could guarantee the compliance of each
process with minor efforts.
Unfortunately, an enforcement mechanism must offer some guarantees to the hospital
on what happens when things are not according to the policy. At present the only offered
formal guarantees is called effective=enforcement that comprises the notions of soundness
and transparency. The latter two notions are currently used in the state of the art
literature on runtime enforcement [22, 35, 52, 61, 64]. As we have seen in the example
of market policy, this notion is necessary but not sufficient. It is also not sufficient in
case of drug dispensation process since it allows outputting the longest valid prefix of the
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execution when another kind of enforcement is preferred.
If we think about practical aspect of enforcement, what the risk manager of the hos-
pital wants to know is “What the enforcement mechanism normally does when a doctor’s
action does not respect the policy?” Does it abort the whole transactions if a research
protocol number is not entered (like Security Automata [59])? Does it alert the head of
the department if we are prescribing a drug out of stock (Usage control enforcement mech-
anism [57])? Does it wait till the doctor opens the therapeutical notes before committing
the transaction to the audit logs (Longest-valid-prefix automaton [51])?
These questions show again that Issue 3 is an important problem. There is no general,
principled guarantee that the illegal executions are transformed in a way that the end
users expect. The notion of effective=enforcement does not provide such guarantee. We
will address this problem in Section 6.1.
Error toleration
Another challenge in policy enforcement is the trade-off between writing simple policies
and enforcing complex run-time behaviors. This is particularly important for workflows
like the drug dispensation process, in which human actors must interact with the policy
enforcement mechanism.
The actual execution of the process must comply with File F process (so that drugs will
be reimbursed by correct parties), as well as with other health and privacy regulations.
Hence, from the perspective of the runtime enforcer, it is a better case if the policy
describes all the rules and regulations that the process executions should be compliant
with.
Unfortunately, from the perspective of policy management, detailed policies are diffi-
cult to write, are difficult to check for consistencies, and de facto impossible to commu-
nicate to the end users. So, the simpler the policy the better. In our case a policy is a
simple drug dispensation process that is, in its essence, a linear sequence of steps (with few
loops for stock replenishing). This is easily understood by doctors and nurses. However
each and every step might be subject to many exceptions or common errors (for example
closing a window instead of pressing the button done). Detailing and representing all
these exceptional steps in a graphical form would make the protocol unreadable.
In our domain there is a further difficulty: our users would definitely insist that there
is only one policy, i.e. the “official” protocol workflow. There is no such a thing as a
policy including all exceptions (this would require validation by the risk manager and the
responsible person for the pharmacy and dispensation process).
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There is another problem in the enforcement of processes. During the executions
doctors, nurses, and pharmacists would not like to be disturbed in their primary mission
(delivering the right drug to the right patient) because an insignificant deviation from
the default workflow has taken place. In the current mechanisms, runtime exceptions and
the consequent additional workload needed to complete the execution distract users and
convince them that “The system doesn’t work”. If such disruptions occur too often users
will increasingly try to bypass the runtime enforcer.
Given this official protocol workflow, the state of the art literature does not propose a
construction of enforcement mechanism that can tolerate some number of exceptions or
common errors that the users may make during the process executions. Up to now, the
runtime enforcement theory provides only strict mechanisms that would not allow any
deviations from the original protocol and rather stop the process execution than tolerate
any error.
Hence there should be a generic algorithm for constructing runtime enforcement mech-
anisms for such systems, where insignificant errors can take place. This problem corre-
sponds to Issue 4 that we will address in Section 6.2.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have presented two case studies that will be used in the rest of this
thesis to compare different enforcement mechanisms.
A case study from the literature is a market policy, that was originally presented in [7].
This is a simple policy, but even for this policy the problem of enforcement is important.
We have also presented a case study from industry: a drug dispensation process from
the hospital describes correct actions that should be done by a doctor in order to comply
with the regulations and File F process, such that the drugs in the end are reimbursed
by the correct parties. The enforcement of this policy also requires discussion and will be
presented later in the next chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Classification of Properties and
Mechanisms
This chapter provides two major contributions. First, we present the existing
classification of security properties and provide a formal definition for a new
kind of security property. This new property is discussed and the relations
to the other properties are shown. Second, we address the problem defined in
previous chapter and show the relations between enforcement mechanisms that
are enforcing the same security property in different ways.
4.1 Notations
In all the formalizations we will use the standard notation in the theory of runtime
enforcement mechanisms [7, 38, 59]. The target is specified at a high level of abstraction,
where Σ is the set of all possible target actions that are relevant for the security policy
(also known as security-relevant actions). An execution sequence, or a trace, is a finite
or infinite sequence of actions; a finite sequence indicates a terminating target execution,
while the infinite one indicates the nonterminating execution of the target. The set of all
finite sequences over Σ is denoted by Σ∗, the set of all infinite sequences is Σω, and the
set of all (finite and infinite) sequences is Σ∞. Execution sequences are denoted by σ or
τ .
The symbol · denotes an empty sequence. By σ[i] we denote the ith action in the
sequence; σ[..i] denotes the prefix of σ involving the actions σ[1] through σ[i]; and σ[i+1..]
denotes the suffix of σ involving all other actions beside σ[..i]. We use the notation τ ;σ
for concatenation of two sequences, where τ must have a finite length.
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The notation τ  σ, or σ  τ denotes that τ is a finite prefix of (possibly infinite)
sequence σ. When τ is a strict prefix of σ (i.e. τ  σ and τ 6= σ), we write τ ≺ σ. We
write ∀τ  σ as an abbreviation for ∀τ ∈ Σ∗ : τ  σ and ∃τ  σ for ∃τ ∈ Σ∗ : τ  σ.
Similarly, we write ∀σ  τ as an abbreviation for ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : σ  τ and ∃σ  τ for
∃σ ∈ Σ∞ : σ  τ .
4.2 Classification of Security Properties
We first give the formal definitions of the security properties in the state of the art that
we informally described in the Section 2.1. Then we introduce a new class of security
properties and show its relation to the other existed classes.
4.2.1 Formal Definitions of Security Properties
As we have discussed, security property is a predicate P̂ for a security policy P . Formally,
for all execution sequences Π ⊆ Σ∞, the following is true:
P (Π) ⇐⇒ ∀σ ∈ Π : P̂ (σ) (4.1)
When a property P̂ holds for an execution sequence, we will say that the sequence is
legal or valid, and when the property does not hold, we will call the sequence illegal or
invalid. We say that an execution sequence σ is irremediable with respect to the property
P̂ when the following holds:
¬P̂ (σ) ∧ ∀τ  σ : ¬P̂ (τ) (4.2)
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the security property P and its charac-
teristic predicate P̂ , hence we will use notation P̂ to refer to the security property and to
its characteristic predicate.
There are three major properties in the literature of runtime enforcement mechanisms:
safety, liveness and renewal properties.
The safety property defines behavior as “nothing bad ever happens”, it means that as
soon as something bad happens, this is irremediable: if the execution became illegal, it
can never become legal again. More formally:
Definition 4.2.1 (Safety property) A property P̂ is a safety property if and only if
∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : (¬P̂ (σ)⇒ ∃σ′  σ : ∀τ  σ′ : ¬P̂ (τ)) (4.3)
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Additional to safety properties, there are liveness properties that claim that every
illegal trace of finite length is not irremediable. In the other words any finite execution
can always be extended to satisfy the property.
Definition 4.2.2 (Liveness property) A property P̂ is a liveness property if and only
if
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : ∃τ  σ : P̂ (τ)) (4.4)
For example, consider a property P̂ specifying that an execution is legal if eventually
an audit is performed which corresponds to an action a in the trace. P̂ is a liveness
property since for every illegal finite-length sequence σ there exists a legal continuation
τ = σ; a.
Ligatti et al. [51] defined a new class of properties called infinite renewal properties.
Formally, a property P̂ is an infinite renewal property on a target with an action set Σ if
and only if the following is true:
Definition 4.2.3 (Infinite renewal property) A property P̂ is an infinite renewal prop-
erty if and only if
∀σ ∈ Σω : P̂ (σ)⇐⇒ (∀σ′  σ : ∃τ  σ : σ′  τ ∧ P̂ (τ)) (4.5)
According to renewal property, every infinite-length sequence is valid if and only if it
has infinitely many valid prefixes. This intuition is written above in this way: an infinite
sequence σ is valid iff for all its prefixes there exists a valid continuation within σ. Notice
that these valid continuations τ are always finite prefixes of σ. For brevity we will call
them “renewal properties” in the rest of this thesis.
Having found out that the same security property can be enforced by different edit
automata and this enforcement can be done in different ways, we decided to investigate
this problem on the example of the security policy in a healthcare domain. Let us come
back to the example of drug selection process and define which kind of security property
it corresponds to. Here the description of the process is actually a default protocol that
the doctor should follow in order to be compliant with the requirements imposed on the
drug selection subprocess. A property P̂ that describes this behavior has a particular
structure: the execution is legal if it consists of iterations that are in turn valid according
to P̂ . We generalize this class as iterative properties (assuming that empty trace is always
valid), a new property introduced in this thesis.
Definition 4.2.4 (Iterative property) A property P̂ is an iterative property if and
only if
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∞ : P̂ (σ) ∧ P̂ (σ′) =⇒ P̂ (σ;σ′) (4.6)
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Legend
1 Nontermination 7 Transaction property
2 Resource availability 8 Termination + file access control
3 Stack inspection 9 Trivial
4 Log out and never open files 10 Increasingly longer sequences
5 Property 4 on system without file-open actions 11 At most 100 SMS messages
6 Eventually audits 12 At most 100 SMS and eventually audit
13 After k transactions send a report
Figure 4.1: Relationships between security properties
4.2.2 Relations Between Security Properties
Figure 4.1 (extending Figure 1 from [51]) represents the relationship between safety, live-
ness, renewal properties and iterative properties from the point of view of good executions.
The original version of this figure contains 9 examples of security properties, while we ex-
tend it by adding a new class of iterative properties and by adding one more example to
every new intersection of existing classes of properties.
Property 1 is a property of nontermination. It is a liveness property since it holds
for all infinite-length traces and it is not a safety property because all the finite prefixes
of the good traces always have good continuations. However, since no finite-length traces
are valid, they will always satisfy the definition of iterative property: the condition on the
left-hand side of the implication will never hold, and hence (even if it’s counterintuitive)
nontermination can be considered an iterative property.
Property 2 originally described in [51] is a liveness and iterative property. Assume
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that the system opens some resource i with action oi and closes it with action ci. The
property 2 claims that all the opened resources must be eventually closed. This property
is a liveness property because any illegal sequence can be made legal by adding all the
necessary closing actions. However, it is not a renewal property because a valid infinite
sequence like o1; o2; c1; . . . oi; ci−1; · · · (where oi corresponds to an opening action and ci
corresponds to a closing action) does not have any valid prefixes. This property is however
iterative, because for any two sequences (where the first one should be finite) that satisfy
this property, their concatenation also satisfies it.
Property 3 is a stack-inspection policy that is a particular kind of an access-control
policy: an access is granted or denied based on the current nesting of function calls. We
will consider a simplified model of stack inspection [39, 42].
Consider the following example: function g has permission to access resource R, but
function f does not have this permission. Function f calls function g and g requests
resource R. The access should not be granted because f does not have required permis-
sions. In order to decide whether the access should be granted or not, the whole chain of
function calls should be examined.
At every function call a new stack frame is created. Each frame contains the local
state of the function and the permissions directly granted to it. One of the simplest way
to calculate the effective permissions is to take an intersection of the permissions of all
functions on the call stack. In the example above, the effective permissions is equal to
perm(f) ∩ perm(g).
We will say that an execution of the program satisfies the stack inspection policy, if
every function call has effective permissions to access the required resource, and at the
end of execution the call stack is empty.
The stack inspection policy is definitely a safety property because once the access
is not granted based even on primitive stack inspection, it cannot be granted later on
because the function in the call stack does not have required permissions. On the other
hand, stack inspection policy is an iterative property because whenever all the functions
in two call stacks of two executions have required permissions and the first execution
finished with an empty call stack, then the concatenation of these two executions again
satisfies the stack inspection policy.
Property 4 “Log out and never open files” is a renewal property. Assume the system
has the following actions: a3 ranges over actions for opening files, a2 over actions for
logging out and a1 over all other actions. The policy says that the user must eventually
log out and never open files. So, this property can be written as (a∗1; a2)
ω. It is not a
safety property because there exists an illegal sequence of only a1 actions that can be
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extended to a legal one by adding a2. It is not a liveness property, because there is an
illegal sequence containing a3 that can never be extended to a legal one. However, it is a
renewal property and also an iterative property because the concatenation of every pair
of legal sequences produce a legal sequence.
Property 5 is the same as property 4 but on a system that only performs actions a1
and a2. The property claims that only sequences of the form (a
∗
1; a2)
ω are valid. Hence,
this property is a liveness property because every invalid finite-length sequence (that
apparently is a sequence of the form a∗1) can be extended to a valid one by adding a2. It is
also a renewal property because every valid infinite-length sequence has an infinite number
of valid prefixes of the form (a∗1; a2)
∗. This property is iterative since the concatenation
of two valid sequences is always valid.
Property 6 specifies that an execution is good if eventually an audit is performed
which corresponds to an action a in the trace. It is obviously a liveness property since every
invalid sequence can be extended to a valid one by adding action a in the end. It is not a
safety property because an invalid sequence (not containing one) has a valid continuation
(containing a). It is a renewal property because an infinite-length valid execution must
have infinitely many prefixes in which a appears, and an innite-length invalid execution
has no valid prex because a never appears. This property is also iterative, because by
concatenating two sequences in which a eventually appears, we get a valid sequence.
Property 7 is called ”transaction property”. Let τ range over finite sequences of
single, legal transactions. A transaction policy is τ∞ and a legal execution is the one
containing any number of valid transactions. This property is not liveness because an
invalid transaction (that is different from τ) can never become valid again. It is a renewal
property because every valid infinite-length sequence of the form τ∞ has infinite number
of valid prefixes τ ∗. It is an iterative property because every concatenation of two valid
sequences of the form τ ∗ and τ∞ produces a valid sequence.
Property 8 is a combination of a termination property and a property ”never access
private files”. Termination by itself is a liveness property because all finite sequences
are valid. The property ”never access private files” is by itself a safety property because
once a private file was accessed, the sequence can not become valid again. However,
the combination of these two properties is neither safety nor liveness. It is also not a
renewal property because invalid infinite sequences (where private files are never accessed)
have infinitely many valid prefixes. However, property 8 is an iterative property. If we
concatenate two legal sequences that are terminated and never access private files then
the resulting sequence is also be legal.
Property 9 is a trivial property that considers all sequences legal. This property is
46
4.2. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
an iterative property as well.
All the properties mentioned so far are iterative properties. We know describe the
properties that are not iterative.
Property 10 “Increasingly longer sequences” states that the sequence is legal if and
only if it is infinite or its length belongs to the following set of numbers {Fi}: F0 = 1,
Fi+1 = 2Fi+1. Every illegal finite sequence can be prolonged such that its length will be-
long to the defined set of numbers, so this is a liveness property. It is also renewal because
every legal infinite-length sequence has an infinite number of legal prefixes. However, this
property is not iterative: by concatenating two legal sequences a new illegal sequence is
always obtained.
Property 11 “at most 100 SMS messages per application run can be sent by a mobile
device.” This property is useful in practice when the use of communication resources has
to be bounded. This property is non-iterative. It is a safety property – if the sequence is
illegal (the application sends more than 100 messages) then there is exists a prefix such
that any continuation of this prefix is an illegal sequence.
Property 12 combines a safety property 11 and a liveness property 6, but as a whole
is neither of them. It states that at most 100 SMS messages can be sent during an
application run and eventually a particular audit action has to be done (for example
making a backup of the application state). This property is not a safety property because
of the eventual audit action, it is also not a liveness one since if the application sent more
than 100 SMS, the trace can never become valid again. It is also not an iterative property
because a concatenation of two runs that sent 100 SMS each does not produce a valid
trace. But this property is a renewal one for the same reason why properties 11 and 6 are
renewal.
Property 13 Assume a repeating process (like a transactional one) where after every
k transactions a report should be sent. In case the report is not sent on time, a letter
with explanations should eventually be sent. This is a liveness property but it is not
iterative because the property holds for 1 transaction and for k−1 transactions, but their
concatenation is not valid because the report for the k transactions is not sent.
These properties above are paradigmatic of the distinction between iterative and non-
iterative properties. Intuitively speaking, iterative properties are properties in which the
number of times a legal sequence is repeated does not matter. We call this repeating se-
quence an iteration. Of course, within the iteration itself the number of times a particular
action is repeated might make a difference between being legal and being illegal, but once
an iteration is legal, it can be repeated as many times as one wishes.
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4.3 Classification of Enforcement Mechanisms
4.3.1 A Model of Enforcement Mechanisms
Let us first introduce enforcement mechanisms as a sequence transformers E : Σ∞ → Σ∞.
We consider a particular form of enforcement mechanism proposed by Bauer et al. and
called edit automaton [7, 51]. Edit automata have a power of inserting and suppressing
actions from the executions. As an example, they can wait until the illegal execution
becomes legal again by suppressing its actions and then insert all the suppressed actions.
They also can behave like a security automata [59] and simply suppress the suffix of the
execution that makes it illegal.
We present our own definition of this automaton that is slightly different from the
original definition in [7] and the refined definition in [51]. Intuitively, we have just sim-
plified the original notions by enucleating the notions of output and memory and always
forced the enforcement mechanism to progress in the processing of the input. We later
show that our actions are identical to the combinations of atomic actions (read symbol
but no output, output symbol but don’t read input) from [51] on every non-diverging
computation (a diverging computation is a computation where the edit automaton will
run forever without reading any input while keeping outputting data). We first present
our own definition of edit automaton.
Definition 4.3.1 (Edit Automata) An edit automaton E is a 5-tuple of the form
〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with respect to some target with action set Σ. Q specifies the possible
states, and q0 ∈ Q is the initial state. The total function δ : Q × Σ → Q specifies the
transition function; the total function γo : Q× Σ∗ × Σ→ Σ∗ defines the output according
to the current state, the sequence of actions kept so far and the current input action; the
total function γk : Q×Σ∗×Σ→ Σ∗ defines the sequence that will be kept after committing
the transition.
In order for the enforcement mechanism to be effective all functions δ, γk and γo should
be computable.
When the automaton proceeds with one more input action, the function γo specifies
the output of the automaton at this transition and the function γk specifies the memory
containing the actions that are processed by the automaton but not output yet. The
keep function will add the input action to the memory or will ignore the input action.
In general case the keep function can perform more actions on the current memory, for
example it can add arbitrary actions to it.
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Definition 4.3.2 (Run of Edit Automaton) Let E = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 be an edit au-
tomaton. A run of automaton E on an input sequence of actions σin = a1; a2; . . . is
a sequence of pairs
〈
(q0, ), (q1, σ
k
1), (q2, σ
k
2), . . .
〉
such that qi+1 = δ(qi, ai+1) and σ
k
i+1 =
γk(qi, σ
k
i , ai+1). The output of E on input σin is sequence of actions σo = σ
o
1;σ
o
2; . . . such
that σoi+1 = γo(qi, σ
k
i , ai+1).
We will use the following notation for a finite run of n steps as
(q0, σ)
σo A(qn, σ[n+ 1..])
which means that the automaton A with initial state q0 on input sequence σ processes a
prefix σ[..i] of this input and finishes in state qn while producing output σo.
Now we present the definition of edit automata from [51]. Every execution of an edit
automaton is specified using a labeled operational semantics. The basic single-step has
the form
(q, σ)
τ−→ (q′, σ′)
where q is the current state of the automaton, σ is the sequence of actions that is in the
input, q′ and σ′ are the state and sequence of actions after the automaton takes a step,
and τ is an output sequence. The definition of edit automaton verbatim from [51] is as
follows:
An edit automaton E is a triple (Q, q0, δL) defined with respect to some system
with action set Σ. As with truncation automata, Q is the possibly countably
infinite set of states, and q0 is the initial state. In contrast to truncation au-
tomata, the deterministic and total transition function δ of an edit automaton
has the form δL : (Q×Σ)→ Q× (Σ ∪ {·}). The transition function specifies,
when given a current state and input action, a new state to enter and either an
action to insert into the output stream (without consuming the input action)
or the empty sequence to indicate that the input action should be suppressed
(i.e., consumed from the input without being made observable).
σ = a;σ′ δL(q, a) = (q′, a′)
(q, σ)
a′−→ (q′, σ)
(E-Ins)
σ = a;σ′ δL(q, a) = (q′, ·)
(q, σ)
·−→ (q′, σ′) (E-Sup)
Remark 4.3.1 In the original paper [51] the transition function δL was defined as an
arbitrary function of the signature mentioned above in the quotation.
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In [51] Ligatti et al. argue that this single-step semantics can easily simulate multi-
step semantics. In the rest of this section we denote the edit automaton defined in [51]
by the wording single step edit automaton.
This automaton allows diverging computation. Formally, it means that after some
action i of some finite input, the automaton will not read any more input symbols and
will only output symbols.
Definition 4.3.3 (Diverging computation) A diverging computation starting in the
state q1 of the single step edit automaton (Q, q0, δL) and triggered by σ ∈ Σ∗ is a sequence
〈q1, q2, . . .〉 ∈ Qω, where Qω is an infinite sequence of states from the set Q, and (qi, σ) a
′
i−→
(qi+1, σ) for some a
′
i ∈ Σ for all i ≥ 1,
Definition 4.3.4 (Effectively diverging computation) A single step edit automaton
E = (Q, q0, δL) has an effectively diverging computation if there exists a finite sequence
σ ∈ Σ∗ and there exists a finite sequence of states 〈q1, q2, . . . , qn〉 such that
1) σ0 = σ, and
2) for all i ≤ n
• either (qi, σi) a
′
i−→ (qi+1, σi) for some a′i ∈ Σ
• or σi = a;σi+1 and (qi, σi) ·−→ (qi+1, σi+1) for some a ∈ Σ and σi ∈ Σ∗, and
3) there exists a diverging computation starting in qn and triggered by σn.
While it was theoretically useful in [51], the very idea that an enforcement mechanism
could possibly produce output without any input is not acceptable by the end users from
our industrial e-health case study. In contrast, the idea that the enforcement mechanism
could spend a lot of time in order to process an input and eventually report a long sequence
of follow-up actions was considered impractical but possible.
So our standpoint is that the only way to produce an infinite output should be to get
an infinite input. Therefore, differently from the original definition in [51], our automaton
consumes an input action a at every transition.
Proposition 4.3.1 For all enforcement mechanisms without effectively diverging compu-
tations edit automata from Definition 4.3.1 and single step edit automata [51] are identical.
Proof. We show how to construct an edit automaton from Definition 4.3.1 given an
edit automaton from the original definition [51]. For all a, σ′, q
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1) if (q, a;σ′) ·−→ (q′, σ′) then δ(q, a) = q′ and for all σk the output and keep functions
are γo(q, σk, a) = · and γk(q, σk, a) = ·
2) if (q, a;σ′) a
′−→ (q′, a;σ′) then one of the two following cases holds:
(a) let 〈q1, . . . qn〉 ∈ Q∗ be the longest sequence such that q = q1 and (qi, a;σ′) a
′
i−→
(qi+1, a;σ
′) for all 0 < i < n and (qn, a;σ′)
·−→ (qn+1, σ′) then δ(q, a) = qn+1
and for all σk the output and keep functions are γo(q, σk, a) = a
′
1; . . . a
′
n−1 and
γk(q, σk, a) = ·
(b) let 〈q1, . . . qn〉 ∈ Q∗ be the sequence such that q = q1 and (qi, a;σ′) a
′
i−→ (qi+1, a;σ′)
for all 0 < i < n and then the automaton stops proceeding the input and out-
putting, because there are no successors from the state qn, then δ(q, a) = qn
and for all σk the output and keep functions are γo(q, σk, a) = a
′
1; . . . a
′
n−1 and
γk(q, σk, a) = ·.
3) otherwise let δ(q, a) = q⊥ and for all σk the output and keep functions are γo(q, σk, a) =
· and γk(q, σk, a) = ·.
It is easy to show that both automata have the same I/O relation. For example, for
the case 2(b): even though the constructed automaton will proceed with the input action
a, since the automaton stops executing the input, the observed behavior (outputting
a′1; . . . a
′
n−1) is still the same. The only difficult part is to show that we can never reach a
state q⊥. Since the edit automaton has no effectively diverging computations this means
that either q⊥ is not reachable by a finite prefix (condition (2) of Definition 4.3.4) or there
cannot be a diverging computation starting in q (condition (3) of Definition 4.3.4). So
the state qn in the construction must exist and thus q⊥ is not reachable.

In the proof of Proposition 4.3.1 the keep function γk always returns an empty se-
quence. This is because γk is an internal function to the automaton: it defines a new
value of the suspended sequence σk that is not used in the proof.
4.3.2 A New Classification of Edit Automata
As we showed in Chapter 3, the same security policy can be enforced by an edit automaton
in different ways. Both edit automata that we have seen in that chapter do enforce the
same market policy, but they are different. We will propose a fine grained classification
of edit automata according to the way they enforce security properties.
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Figure 4.2: Relation between the classes of edit automata
In Figure 4.2 we anticipate the main results of this section by showing the hierarchy of
different kinds of edit automata that we explain and prove later in this section. Later in
Figure 4.7 we will pictorially describe the precise relations among different kinds of edit
automata.
We start with a wide class of edit automata called Late automata. They simply output
some prefix of the input. This class will be the container of other less trivial cases when
the property P̂ will be taken into account.
Definition 4.3.5 (Late automata) A Late automaton A is an edit automaton A =
〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with the restriction that it always outputs some prefix of the input:
∀i ∈ N : ∃j ≤ i : ∃q′ ∈ Q : (q0, σ) σ[..j] A(q′, σ[i+ 1..]) (4.7)
Property (4.7) means that for every processed prefix σ[..i] of the input sequence there
exists a run of edit automaton A such that it outputs some prefix σ[..j] of the processed
input sequence σ[..i]. We call this property output latency since it means that at every
step of execution automaton outputs some prefix of the input.
The example of Late automaton is shown in Figure 4.3. This automaton simply
outputs the first action of the input after reading the second one and then outputs second
and third actions after reading the third action.
In order to give a formal definition of the automata from Theorem 8 [7] for any
property P̂ we present also a wider class of automata called All-Or-Nothing automata.
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Figure 4.3: Example of Late automaton.
Figure 4.4: Example of All-Or-Nothing automaton.
These automata always output some prefix of the input (hence it is a particular kind of
Late automata). Moreover, on every transition they either output all suspended input
actions or suppress the current action.
Definition 4.3.6 (All-Or-Nothing automata) An All-Or-Nothing automaton A is
an edit automaton A = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with the following restrictions:
• This automaton outputs a prefix of the input: property (4.7) holds.
• At every step of the transition either it outputs the whole suspended sequence of
actions (the input symbols read by the automaton but not in the output yet) or
suppresses the current action:
(γo(q, σk, a) = σk; a and γk(q, σk, a) = ·) or
(γo(q, σk, a) = · and γk(q, σk, a) = σk; a)
(4.8)
An example of All-Or-Nothing automaton is given in Figure 4.4.
The next step is the refinement of this class towards what we call Longest-valid-
prefix Automata for P̂ 1. These automata always output a prefix of the input (hence
it is a particular kind of Late automata) and they are particular kind of All-Or-Nothing
1In the previous papers [12, 17, 14] we called it Ligatti automaton.
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automata. Moreover, they output the longest valid prefix. The definition of Longest-valid-
prefix automaton for property P̂ given below was made according to the construction of
edit automaton given in the proof of Theorem 8 [7].
Definition 4.3.7 (Longest-valid-prefix automata for property P̂ ) A Longest-valid-
prefix automaton E for property P̂ is an edit automaton E = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with the
following restrictions:
• The automaton outputs a prefix of the input (4.7).
• Either it outputs the whole suspended sequence of actions or suppresses the current
action (4.8).
• Output is valid at every transition (here σ′ is an already output sequence)
P̂ (σ′; γo(q, σk, a)) (4.9)
• If in the state q the current sequence σ′;σk; a is valid then it outputs the whole
sequence:
If P̂ (σ′;σk; a) then
γo(q, σk, a) = σk; a and γk(q, σk, a) = ·.
(4.10)
At every state a Longest-valid-prefix automaton for property P̂ keeps the sequence
that was read till the current moment (and consists of already output sequence σ′ and
kept but not yet output sequence σk) in order to decide whether P̂ (σ
′;σk; a) holds. A
possible way of implementing this is Q= Σ∗. In our definition a Longest-valid-prefix
automaton for property P̂ is obviously a particular kind of edit automaton. We will show
that this statement holds in the original definition as well.
Let us now remind the constructive proof of Theorem 8 [7] and show that the edit
automaton constructed following this proof is a Longest-valid-prefix Automaton for P̂ .
The proof of Theorem 8 in [7] constructs an edit automaton as follows:
- States: q ∈ Σ∗ × Σ∗ × {+,−} [the sequence of actions seen so far, the actions seen
but not emitted, and +(−) is used to indicate that the automaton must not (must)
suppress the current action]
- The initial state q0 = 〈·, ·,+〉.
- Consider processing the action a in state q.
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(A) If q = 〈σ, τ,+〉 and ¬P̂ (σ; a) then suppress a and continue in state 〈σ; a, τ ; a,+〉.
(B) If q = 〈σ, τ,+〉 and P̂ (σ; a) then insert τ ; a and continue in state 〈σ; a, ·,−〉.
(C) Otherwise, q = 〈σ, τ,−〉. Suppress a and continue in state 〈σ; a, ·,+〉.
Proposition 4.3.2 The edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8
in [7] for property P̂ is a Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ .
Proof. Consider processing the action a, σo is the output so far, σk is a suppressed
sequence of actions. Let us have a look at two main steps of the construction:
• if ¬P̂ (σo;σk; a) then suppress a , σ′k = σk; a.
• if P̂ (σo;σk; a) then insert σk; a.
Since at every step the output is empty or σk; a then the automaton obeys the property
(4.8); it always outputs prefix of the input, hence statement (4.7) holds as well. Con-
structed automaton outputs the sequence only if it is valid, hence statement (4.9) holds.
It outputs all the suppressed actions if the sequence becomes valid, therefore statement
(4.10) holds as well. Since all the conditions of Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ are
satisfied, we conclude that automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 in [7]
for property P̂ is Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ .

Proposition 4.3.2 also holds for the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [51].
In a nutshell, the difference between edit automata and Longest-valid-prefix automata
for property P̂ is the following:
• edit automata can suppress arbitrary actions from the input without inserting them
later and can insert arbitrary actions in the output.
• Longest-valid-prefix automata for property P̂ can only insert those actions that
were read before; suppressed actions either will be inserted when the input sequence
becomes valid or all subsequent actions will be suppressed (in other words, it outputs
the longest valid prefix of the input).
Since the automaton constructed according to the proof of Theorem 8 in [7] is a
Longest-valid-prefix automaton for property P̂ while the automaton given in [7] (Fig-
ure 3.1) is not a Longest-valid-prefix automaton, the difference between their behaviors
is clear.
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Figure 4.5: Example of Late automaton for property P̂ .
Still, the automaton of Figure 3.1 is not a completely arbitrary edit automaton and
we propose a notion of Late automaton for property P̂ . If the sequence is valid, it outputs
a valid prefix of the input, otherwise it can output some valid sequence (i.e. fixing the
input).
Definition 4.3.8 (Late automata for property P̂ ) A Late automaton A for P̂ is an
edit automaton A = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with the following restrictions (σ′ is with the following
restrictions (σ′ is a sequence that is in the output already, σk is a sequence of an input
symbols read by the automaton but not in the output yet):
If P̂ (σ′;σk; a) then
• Output is a prefix of the input (4.7), and
• Output is always valid (4.9).
The example of Late automaton for property P̂ is shown in Figure 4.5. This automaton
is similar to the one given in Figure 3.1 with the only difference that it delays the output
of the first take-pay transaction.
4.3.3 Relations between the Edit Automata Classes
Many authors [7, 33, 45, 51] have noted the importance of enforcement mechanisms obey-
ing two abstract principles, called soundness and transparency.
Definition 4.3.9 (Soundness) The enforcement mechanism that enforces property P̂ is
sound if all the outputs are legal according to the property:
∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : P̂ (E(σ)) (4.11)
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Definition 4.3.10 (Transparency) An enforcement mechanism is transparent if it does
not change the executions that already obey P̂ :
∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : P̂ (σ)⇒ E(σ) ≈ σ (4.12)
In the original papers [7, 51] notation τ ≈ σ means that τ and σ are semantically
equivalent. However, the authors did not impose any restrictions on semantic-equivalence
relation except that it should be an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, and transi-
tive), and that the security property of interest does not distinguish between semantically
equivalent executions. More precisely, we take a notion of Indistinguishability from [51]:
∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ∞ : σ ≈ σ′ ⇒ (P̂ (σ) ⇐⇒ P̂ (σ′)) (4.13)
Since the semantic-equivalence relation is not precisely defined, we will be more in-
terested and can be different for each target application, we will use the identity ”=”
relation.
One of the definition of enforcement in [7] is precise enforcement, that obeys both
soundness and transparency.
Definition 4.3.11 (Precise Enforcement) An automaton A with starting state q0 pre-
cisely enforces a property P̂ on the system with action set Σ if and only if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ ∃q′
∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ such that
1. (q0, σ)
σ′ A(q′, ·), and
2. P̂ (σ′), and
3. P̂ (σ)⇒ ∀i ∈ N : ∃q′′ ∈ Q : (q0, σ) σ[..i] A(q′′, σ[i+ 1..])
According to this definition, the automaton in question outputs program actions in
lock-step with the target program’s action stream if the action stream σ is valid. Suppose
that at the current moment the automaton reads i-th action in the sequence, and the
sequence σ[..i+ 1] is not valid. Then the automaton will not output any other actions.
There is another notion of enforcement called “effective = enforcement” [7] (with later
refinement in [51]) that obeys the properties of soundness and transparency and output
production (for any input there is an output).
Definition 4.3.12 (Effective=Enforcement) An automaton A with starting state q0
effectively=enforces a property P̂ on the system with action set Σ if and only if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ ∃q′
∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ such that
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1. (q0, σ)
σ′ A(q′, ·), and
2. P̂ (σ′), and
3. P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′
Then we introduce a refinement of effective=enforce-ment, where an automaton can
suppress some actions and later insert them when the sequence turns out to be legal. We
name it Late effective=enforcement.
Definition 4.3.13 (Late Effective=Enforcement) An edit automaton A with starting
state q0 lately effectively=en-forces a property P̂ on the system with action set Σ if and
only if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ ∃q′ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ such that
1. (q0, σ)
σ′ A(q′, ·), and
2. P̂ (σ′), and
3. P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′, and
4. ∀i ∈ N : ∃j ≤ i : ∃q′ ∈ Q : (q0, σ) σ[..j] A(q′, σ[i+ 1..]).
The definition above obeys four properties of enforcement: output production (1),
soundness (2), transparency (3) and output latency, which is originally presented in equa-
tion (4.7).
Notice that edit automaton that lately effectively=en-forces a property P̂ will always
output some valid prefix of the input. This conclusion is obvious because soundness
ensures that all output is valid and output latency ensures that output is always a prefix
of the input.
We show an example of edit automaton that lately effectively=enforces a property P̂
in Figure 4.6.
It is easy to see from the definitions that edit automata that lately effectively=enforce
a property P̂ are a proper subset of edit automata that effectively=enforce P̂ . An example
is the edit automaton in Figure 3.1 that effectively=enforces property P̂ . From an illegal
input sequence take(1); browse; take(2); pay(2) it produces warning; take(2); pay(2)
while automaton in Figure 4.6 that lately effectively=enforces P̂ outputs nothing.
As it is said in [7] edit automaton from Figure 3.1 effectively=enforces the market
policy (Example 3.1.1). But since the market policy is given only in natural language and
the predicate P̂ is not given, statements such as “An edit automata effectively enforces
the market policy” are a bit stretching the definition.
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Figure 4.6: Edit automaton that lately effectively=enforces property P̂ .
Proposition 4.3.3 Late automata and Late automata for property P̂ are not a proper
subset of each other.
Proof. First we prove that if an edit automaton A is a Late automaton, then it is not
necessary that A is a Late automaton for property P̂ . By σ we denote an input sequence
of the automaton and σ′ is an output sequence. A Late automaton A obeys only one
property: it always outputs some prefix of the input (4.7). Hence, even if the overall
input sequence σ is valid, A can output an invalid prefix of the input (¬P̂ (σ′)), while
Late automaton for property P̂ will always output a valid sequence (4.9).
Next we prove that if edit automaton A is a Late automaton for property P̂ then it
is not necessary that A is a Late automaton. In case of invalid input sequence the Late
automaton for property P̂ can output another sequence which is not necessarily a prefix
of the input, while a Late automaton will always output a prefix of the input (4.7). 
For example, for input sequence σ = take(1); browse the Late automaton from Fig-
ure 4.3 will output take(1) action which is not valid while the Late automaton for
property P̂ from Figure 4.5 will output warning action.
From Proposition 4.3.3 we can conclude that classes of Late automata and Late au-
tomata for P̂ have some common subclass but none of them include the other.
Theorem 4.3.1 Edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ are a proper subset of
Late automata for P̂ .
Proof. First we prove that if an edit automaton A effectively=enforces property P̂
then A is a Late automaton for property P̂ . By σ we denote an input sequence of the
automaton and σ′ is an output sequence. The automaton A that effectively=enforces P̂
obeys the properties P̂ (σ′) and P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′. If σ is valid it outputs the whole sequence,
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so automaton A is a Late automaton for P̂ because it outputs a valid prefix (σ is a valid
prefix of itself). If σ is invalid, automaton A can output an arbitrary valid sequence while
Late automaton for property P̂ can output any arbitrary sequence (valid or invalid).
Next we have to prove that if an edit automaton A is a Late automaton for property
P̂ then it is not necessary that A effectively=enforces property P̂ . In case of a valid input
the Late automaton for P̂ will output some valid prefix of the input and not necessary
the whole input, hence the property of effective=enforce-ment P̂ (σ) ⇒ σ = σ′ will not
hold. 
For example, the Late automaton for P̂ from Figure 4.5 for a valid input take(1);
pay(1) will output nothing while the automaton from Figure 3.1 that effectively=enforces
property P̂ will output the whole input take(1); pay(1).
Proposition 4.3.4 Edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ are not a subset of
Late automata.
Proof. We prove that if an edit automaton A effectively=enforces property P̂ then it
is not necessary that A is a Late automaton. By σ we denote an input sequence of the
automaton and σ′ is an output sequence. The automaton A that effectively=enforces P̂
obeys the properties: P̂ (σ′) and P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′. In case of invalid input, the automaton
A will output some valid sequence (according to soundness), which is not necessary a
prefix of the input. Therefore it is not necessarily a Late automaton. 
For example, the automaton from Figure 3.1 that effectively=enforces property P̂ for
an invalid input take(1); browse will output the warning action which is not possible
for a Late automaton that has to output some prefix of the input.
Theorem 4.3.2 Edit automata that lately effectively=enforce a property P̂ are exactly
those Late automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ .
Proof. Similarly to the definitions of late effective=enforcement and effective=enforcement
by σ we denote an input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an output sequence.
(If Direction). If edit automaton A lately effectively=enforces property P̂ then it obeys
the property of output latency (4.7) and hence A is a Late automaton. According to defi-
nitions 4.3.12 and 4.3.13, since A lately effective-ly=enforces P̂ it also effectively=enforces
P̂ .
(Only-if direction). If A is a Late automaton that effectively=enforces property P̂ then it
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always outputs some valid prefix of the input (since it obeys soundness and output latency)
and in case of valid input it outputs the whole input sequence (property of transparency).
Hence, first three conditions of late effective= enforcement hold. The 4rd property holds
as well because A is a Late automaton. Hence A lately effectively=enforces P̂ . 
It is immediate from the definitions the following results:
Proposition 4.3.5 Edit automata that precisely enforce property P̂ are a proper subset
of edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ .
Proof. If an edit automaton precisely enforce property P̂ then for the valid input
sequence it will output in a lock-step mode the whole sequence, hence the property of
transparency holds. All the other properties of effective=enforcement hold as well.
If an edit automaton effectively=enforces property P̂ then it is not necessary that it
precisely enforces P̂ . For an invalid input σ that has a valid prefix σ′  σ, it can output
some valid sequence which does not necessarily have a prefix σ′. 
Proposition 4.3.6 Edit automata that precisely enforce property P̂ are not a subset of
Late Automata.
Proof. The proof is straightforward: for an illegal input edit automaton that precisely
enforce property P̂ can output a sequence that is not necessarily a prefix of the input,
however a Late Automaton always outputs some prefix of the input. 
Proposition 4.3.7 All-Or-Nothing automata are a proper subset of Late automata.
Proof. First we show that if A is All-Or-Nothing automaton then A is a Late automa-
ton. Since (4.7) holds for All-Or-Nothing automaton A, then A is a Late automaton.
Next we show that if A∗ is a Late automaton then it is not necessary that A∗ is an All-
Or-Nothing automaton. A∗ can output some prefix of the input that can be some prefix
of all suppressed actions. In this case A∗ is not an All-Or-Nothing automaton because 4.8
does not hold. 
For example, the Late automaton from Figure 4.3 for an input sequence take(1);
browse will output only take(1) action. The given Late automaton can not be an
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All-Or-Nothing automaton because it can output some non-empty prefix of the input
sequence.
Proposition 4.3.8 All-Or-Nothing automata are not a subset of Late automata for prop-
erty P̂ .
Proof. We show that if A is an All-Or-Nothing automaton, then it is not necessary
that A is a Late automaton for property P̂ . An All-Or-Nothing automaton A can output
some invalid prefix of the valid input which is not possible for a Late automaton for P̂ .

For example, the All-Or-Nothing automaton shown in Figure 4.4 for the input sequence
take(1); pay(1); take(2) outputs an invalid prefix of this sequence (in this case the
whole sequence) while this is not possible for a Late automaton for property P̂ .
Proposition 4.3.9 Edit automata that lately effectively=enforces property P̂ and All-Or-
Nothing automata are not a proper subset of each other.
Proof. First we prove that if an edit automaton A lately effectively=en-forces property
P̂ then it is not necessary that A is an All-Or-Nothing automaton. By σ we denote an
input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an output sequence. Automaton A can output
some valid prefix of the input which is not necessarily all the suppressed actions, hence
A is not All-Or-Nothing automaton.
Next we prove that if edit automaton A∗ is an All-Or-Nothing automaton then it is not
necessary that A∗ lately effectively=enforces P̂ . At some step A∗ can output some invalid
prefix of the input while automaton that lately effectively=enforces P̂ always outputs only
valid prefix of the input. 
For example, the automaton given in Figure 4.6 that lately effectively=enforces prop-
erty P̂ for an input sequence take(1); pay(1); take(2) outputs the sequence take(1);
pay(1). The given automaton cannot be an All-Or-Nothing automaton because after
take(2) action it outputs non-empty prefix of the suppressed sequence.
On the other hand, for the input sequence take(1); pay(1); take(2) the All-Or-
Nothing automaton from Figure 4.4 outputs the whole input sequence, which is invalid.
This automaton cannot be considered as automaton that lately effectively=enforces prop-
erty P̂ because it produces illegal output.
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Theorem 4.3.3 All-Or-Nothing automata that lately effectively=enforce a property P̂ are
exactly Longest-valid-prefix automata for property P̂ .
Proof. We show that All-Or-Nothing automaton A lately effectively=en-forces a prop-
erty P̂ if and only if A is a Longest-valid-prefix automaton for property P̂ .
(If Direction). If automaton A is All-Or-Nothing automaton then equations (4.7)
and (4.8) hold. Since A lately effectively=enforces property P̂ then it obeys the prop-
erties of soundness (condition 2 of Definition 4.3.13) and transparency (condition 3 of
Definition 4.3.13). Notice that soundness means that the output is always valid, which
is exactly what equation (4.9) describes; transparency means that if input is valid then
output is equal to the input, which is shown in equation (4.10). Hence, all the conditions
of Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ are satisfied.
(Only-if direction). If A is a Longest-valid-prefix automaton for property P̂ then
• It obeys properties (4.7) and (4.8) hence A is an All-Or-Nothing automaton, and
then according to Proposition 4.3.7 it is also a Late automaton;
• It obeys properties (4.9) and (4.10) and as we noticed, they mean soundness and
transparency which correspond to the conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 4.3.12. Hence,
A effectively=enforces P̂ .
Therefore sinceA is Late automaton that effectively=enforces P̂ then it lately effectively=en-
forces P̂ according to Theorem 4.3.2 and it is an All-Or-Nothing automaton. 
4.3.4 Discussion
In this Section we have shown that the difference between the running example from
Figure 2 of [7] and the edit automata that are constructed according to Theorem 8 of
the same paper is due to a deeper theoretical difference. In Figure 4.7 we summarize
the relations among the different kinds of edit automata that we have introduced. When
drawing two boxes separated by a space we mean that inclusion is probably not proper.
We have proven the correctness of this classification earlier in this section.
Now we clarify which type of edit automaton is constructed following the proof of
Theorem 8 in [7] for property P̂ and which type of edit automaton is the one in [7]
(Figure 3.1). As the Proposition 4.3.2 states, the edit automaton constructed following
the proof of Theorem 8 in [7] for property P̂ is a Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ . The
edit automaton given in Figure 3.1 [7] is an edit automaton that effectively=enforces P̂ :
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A new classification of edit automata. Here point “Thm. 8” represents an edit automaton constructed
following the proof of Theorem 8 [7] and point “Fig. 2” represents an edit automaton from Figure 2
originally from [7]. We can see that both of them effectively=enforce the given property, but the Longest-
valid-prefix automaton from Theorem 8 is just a particular type of edit automata.
Figure 4.7: The classes of edit automata.
it obeys soundness (the automaton always outputs the valid sequence) and transparency
(in case of valid input it always outputs all the sequence). The edit automaton given in
Figure 3.1 [7] is not a Late automaton because it does not always output some prefix of
the input (see examples 8 and 10 in Table 3.2)
Therefore we can conclude that both automata from Theorem 8 [7] and from Fig-
ure 3.1 [7] are edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ . But when one wants
to construct such an automaton and follows the proof of Theorem 8 [7], he obtains a
Longest-valid-prefix automaton for P̂ that lately effectively=enforces P̂ .
In other words the intuition behind the classification is the following one: Late au-
tomata always output some prefix of the input while Late automata for P outputs only
valid prefixes. It is maybe surprising, but Late automata for P are not a proper subset
of Late Automata precisely because of their behavior in case of non-compliant input (See
Proposition 4.3.3).
The whole characterization of the automata in this classification is based on the idea
that some of them depend on the policy P and hence, the behavior of the automata in the
class is the same only for compliant inputs. In case of non-compliant inputs the automata
only convert the inputs to compliant ones. This is exactly the case for the automaton
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from Figure 2 in [7]: it is a Late automaton that effectively=enforces P .
An edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 [7] is the Longest-
valid-prefix automata for P , that modifies non-compliant execution in a particular way
because it can only suppress the invalid input and wait until it becomes valid in the future.
4.4 Summary
In Section 4.2 have proposed a new notion of iterative security property and defined
relations between the security properties from the state of the art (safety, liveness and
renewal) and iterative property. The result of this contribution is presented in Figure 4.1.
We have presented a classification of particular types of edit automata in Section 4.3.
From this classification and examples of edit automata, we can conclude that the main
difference between different edit automata effectively=enforcing the same policy is in the
way they convert non-compliant sequences into compliant ones. We have proposed a
solution to Issue 1, but leads us to Issue 2.
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Chapter 5
Construction of Enforcement
Mechanisms
As we have seen, an edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theo-
rem 8 [7] is actually a Longest-valid-prefix automaton, a specific kind of edit
automaton. In this chapter we will show how given a security property we can
build a Longest-valid-prefix automaton. Later, we find out how an iterative
security property can be enforced by another particular kind of edit automaton
and show how to construct it.
5.1 Additional Notations
First we need to present some additional notations we will use in all the constructions
of this and later chapters. It is simpler to represent the memory of the edit automaton
rather than defining the keep function. The notation (q, σi, σk) represents the current
configuration of edit automaton, where q is the current state, σi is the current input
sequence, and σk is the current memory containing suspended actions. A transition of an
edit automaton is denoted by
(q, σi, σk)
σo
↪→ (q′, σ′i, σ′k) (5.1)
where σo is the output produced, and respectively q
′, σ′i and σ
′
k are the new state, the
input sequence left to read and the updated memory. Notice that since we do not allow
diverging computations, it is always that case that ∃a ∈ Σ : σi = a;σ′i.
In the sequel we will show the graphical representation of an automaton. Every tran-
sition of the form: (q, a;σ′i, σk)
σo
↪→ (q′, σ′i, σ′k) we will represent as it is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Representation of a transition of edit automaton.
We will also use the following notation. Whenever σo = σk; a, we will show it graphi-
cally as ∗; a representing the current memory by ∗. Similarly, whenever σ′k = σk; a we will
show it as ∗; a.
Before proposing the constructive procedure for edit automata we first need to formally
define an input to that procedure, hence we now specify how the security property is
represented in our framework.
5.2 Property Representation
In practice desired behavior of an application is often described as a workflow. We rep-
resent workflows and security properties by a new kind of finite state automaton. In our
model we assume both finite and infinite execution sequences, hence we need another
notion of automaton that can represent a “default” workflow.
Definition 5.2.1 (Policy automaton) A Policy automaton is a tuple 〈Σ, Q, q0, δ, F 〉,
where Σ is a finite nonempty set of security-relevant actions, Q is a finite set of states,
q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ : Q × Σ → Q is a labeled partial transition function. In the
following, for q, q′ ∈ Q, a ∈ Σ we will write q a−→ q′ whenever δ(q, a) = q′. F ⊆ Q is a set
of accepting states.
Definition 5.2.2 (Run of a Policy automaton) Let A = 〈Σ, Q, q0, δ, F 〉 be a pol-
icy automaton. A run of A on a finite (respectively infinite) sequence of actions σ =
〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉 is a sequence of states q|σ| = 〈q0, q1, q2 . . .〉 such that qi ai−→ qi+1. A fi-
nite run is accepting if the last state of the run is an accepting state. An infinite run is
accepting if the automaton goes through some accepting states infinitely often.
The Policy automaton combines the acceptance conditions of Bu¨chi automata and
finite state automata.
Definition 5.2.3 (Property represented as Policy automaton) Some property P̂ is
represented as a Policy automaton A if and only if:
∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : P̂ (σ)⇐⇒ A accepts σ (5.2)
68
5.2. PROPERTY REPRESENTATION
Figure 5.2: Policy automaton for a market policy.
Remark 5.2.1 We assume that an empty sequence that corresponds to no execution of
the target is always accepted by the security property (P̂ (·) holds) and hence the initial
state of the Policy automaton is always accepting: q0 ∈ F .
Notice that the set of infinite traces accepted by a Policy automaton represents a
renewal property since a valid infinite trace corresponds to a run that goes infinitely often
through an accepting state, and hence this trace has an infinite number of valid prefixes.
More formally:
Proposition 5.2.1 The set of infinite traces accepted by a Policy automaton is a renewal
property.
Proof. Let us prove the theorem by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a string
σ ∈ Σω such that Policy automaton A accepts σ but σ does not satisfy a definition of
renewal property (4.5).
Then there exists a sequence σ′, σ′  σ such that ∀τ. τ  σ. σ′  τ.¬P̂ (τ). In this
case there exists a run s = 〈s0, s1, . . . , sd, . . .〉 for a sequence of actions σ = 〈a1, . . . , ad, . . .〉
such that sd is not an accepting state. Since σ is accepted by A there must be a successor
state of sd that is accepting (otherwise s would have only finitely many accepting states),
i.e., a subsequence of s = 〈s0, s1, . . . , sd, . . . , sl〉 such that at least sl is accepting then the
corresponding sequence of actions τl = 〈a1, . . . , ad, . . . , al〉 is such that σ′  τl  σ∧ P̂ (τl)
which is a contradiction. 
In Figure 5.2 we present a Policy automaton for the market policy from Example 3.1.1.
We have noticed that the text of the example leaves open a number of interpretations.
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Remark 5.2.2 Notice that the set of security relevant actions Σ is finite, and a number
of apples in the market, that one can take or pay for, is finite as well. Hence, the Policy
automaton in Figure 5.2 has finite number of transitions.
It is clear that good sequences must have a pair of take(n) and pay(n) as the text
implies, so the automaton accepts these sequences. Otherwise if after take(n) action
there were some action different from pay(n) then the policy would be violated and the
automaton would halt. If after pay(n) action there are some other actions different from
pay and take (like browse) then the automaton simply waits for the take(n) action. It
is not clear whether another take(m) action is allowed by example at this point, so that
the resulting sequence of actions can be pay(n); take(m); pay(m); take(n). The text
seems to imply that this is not possible, so the automaton will halt whenever take(m)
appears after pay(n) and m 6= n.
Similarly, in Figure 5.3 we present an automaton corresponding to the BPMN descrip-
tion of the drug selection subprocess (Figure 3.4). This example precisely defines all the
possible valid sequences of actions and is easily represented as an automaton.
5.3 Longest-valid-prefix Automata
We have seen in Chapter 4 the classification of edit automata and the Longest-valid-prefix
automata in particular. This automata are constructed from the security policy following
the proof of Theorem 8 of [7], and, as we have defined, they always output the longest
valid prefix of the execution.
5.3.1 Construction
According to Definition 5.2.1, the security policy is represented by a finite-state Policy
automaton AP =
〈
Σ, QP , qP0 , δ
P , F P
〉
. We construct the Longest valid prefix automaton
in Figure 5.4.
Let us describe the idea behind this construction. Suppose the current state of the
automaton is q, the next incoming action is a. If there is a transition in the Policy
automaton from the state q on an action a to an accepting state, then the input read
so far is accepted by the Policy Automaton. Therefore, we output all the actions read
so far followed by the current action (we output σk; a in rule [Good-Out]). If the next
state is non-accepting, it means that possibly there is a path to the accepting state, so
the sequence read so far can become good. Therefore we simply keep the current action
in the memory (we put in the memory σk; a and output nothing in rule [Good-Wait]).
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Abbreviations
Dis = Drug is selected DNr = Drug is Not for research
Tnn = Therapeutical notes needed Ipd = Insert prescription details
Rtn = Review therapeutical notes DNas = Drug is Not available in stock
TnNn = Therapeutical notes Not needed Dpew = Drug physically exists in the ward
Dr = Drug is for research Das = Drug is available in stock
Irpn = Insert research protocol number
Figure 5.3: Policy automaton for a drug selection subprocess.
If there is no transition from state q on action a, it means that there is no path to some
accepting state of the Policy automaton, and the sequence can never become valid again.
So the next state in the automata has to be a new error state q⊥, the Longest-valid-prefix
automaton will output nothing but keep all the input, and this corresponds to the rule
[Errorkeep].
The behavior of the constructed Longest-valid-prefix automaton is exactly the same
as of one constructed by the proof of Theorem 8 of [7]: it always outputs the longest
valid prefix of the input. The only difference is that in the proof Theorem 8 the state
of automaton contains all the read actions and if the trace can never become good again
there will be as many states as the length of the trace. In our construction, as soon as the
trace cannot become good again, the next state will be an error state and all following
input actions will be kept. To optimize the construction we can also skip all the following
inputs once the automaton is in the error state. Then the rule [Error] can be rewritten
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Good-Out
q
a−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P
(q, a;σi, σk)
σk;a
↪→ (q′, σi, ·)
Good-Wait
q
a−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P
(q, a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ (q′, σi, σk; a)
Errorkeep
Otherwise
(q, a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ (q⊥, σi, σk; a)
Figure 5.4: Semantics for Longest-valid-prefix automaton constructed from the Policy
automaton.
as follows:
Error
Otherwise
(q, a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ (q⊥, σi, ·)
In the sequel an enforcement mechanism that outputs the longest valid prefix will be
called ELP , where LP stands for “the longest prefix”.
5.3.2 Formal Properties
According to our construction, the resulting Longest-valid-prefix automaton for security
property P̂ is sound sine all it’s outputs are valid prefixes, and it is transparent since the
longest valid prefix of a valid input is this input.
Proposition 5.3.1 A Longest-valid-prefix automaton with the semantics from Figure 5.4
for a renewal property P̂ represented by Policy automaton AP is sound and transparent
enforcement mechanism according to P̂ . This automaton always outputs the longest valid
prefix of the input.
Proof. Given a Policy automaton AP we construct a Longest-valid-prefix automaton
E following according to the semantics from Figure 5.4. Let us show that automaton E
always outputs the longest valid prefix of the input according to the property P̂ .
Let us denote the state of E after executing sequence σ with q, and a is the next
incoming action. Let us show that this automaton maintains the invariant InvL(σ) that
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σ is the input seen so far and σo has been output, where σo is the longest valid prefix
of σ according to P̂ . Initially InvL(·) holds because P̂ (·) and automaton has not output
anything so far. Let us assume that InvL(σ) holds and prove that InvL(σ; a) holds as
well in any action a.
1) If P̂ (σ; a), then there is an accepting run of AP on σ; a. It corresponds to the rule
[Good-Wait]. In this case the output of E is σk; a. The memory was obtained in a
following way. Every time when the non-accepting state is reached, the action is kept
in the memory (rule [Good-Wait]) and when finally the sequence becomes valid, a
corresponding state of AP is accepting and the memory of E contains all the read
actions. Hence, the output in this case will be σ; a and InvL(σ; a) holds.
2) If σ; a is not irremediable1, then it may become legal again in the future. It means
that while executing σ the path in E will correspond to the path in AP , to be more
precise, for every transition q
σ[i]−−→ q′ of the policy automaton, there will be a transition
(q, σ[i, ..], σk)
τo
↪→ (q′, σ[i + 1, ..], τk), where τo, τk are either a pair ·, σk;σ[i] or a pair
σk;σ[i], ·. Therefore, only statements premises of rules [Good-Out] and [Good-
Wait] will be satisfied. Hence E outputs the longest valid prefix and the memory
contains all the not yet output actions that make a trace bad and InvL(σ; a) holds.
3) If σ; a is irremediable then there was an action σ[j] (or a) in the input such that there
was no transition in AP from the state where the run σ[..j − 1] (or σ) arrived on the
input action σ[j]. At that point a premise for rule [Error] was satisfied, after which
no output can be produced. Therefore, if there exists a valid prefix, then it was output
when the corresponding accepting state of AP was reached before the sequence became
irremediable. It means that E outputs the longest valid prefix and InvL(σ; a) holds.
Therefore, in all the cases the invariant InvL(σ; a) is maintained and hence the Longest-
valid-prefix automaton E with the semantics from Figure 5.4 always outputs the longest
valid prefix. Therefore, in case of valid input the automaton will not change the in-
put (transparency maintained) and in case of invalid input it will output a valid trace
(soundness maintained). 
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Figure 5.5: Policy automaton for market policy
Figure 5.6: Edit automaton for market policy verbatim from [7]
Figure 5.7: Longest-valid-prefix automaton constructed for market policy
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5.3.3 Enforcement of the Market Policy
We remind the representation of the market policy as a Policy automaton in Figure 5.5,
the Longest-valid-prefix automaton with the semantics from Figure 5.4 in Figure 5.7, and
the original edit automaton from [7] is in Figure 5.6. To ease the comparison we represent
the original edit automaton with our new notation.
It is easy to see that these automata enforce the same policy in different ways. This is
due to the fact that the Longest-valid-prefix automaton from Figure 5.7 always outputs
the longest valid prefix of the execution sequence while the edit automaton from Figure 5.6
enforces the given property in some other way. Even if we look in more detail at legal
sequences, we already can see the difference. The legal sequence pay(n); browse; take(n)
is not transformed by the Longest-valid-prefix automaton (transparency holds), but the
edit automaton from [7] transforms it to browse; take(n); pay(n). In our opinion, it is
more desirable to leave the execution sequence without changes when it is valid.
Let us compare the transformation of illegal sequences, for example pay(n); take(m);
take(m); pay(m). The Longest-valid-prefix automaton from Figure 5.7 will not produce
any output because this sequence does not have a valid prefix. On the other hand, the
edit automaton from Figure 5.6 will produce some output: take(m); pay(m). We can see
that this automaton has a power of “restarting” (it is coming back to the initial state as
if no error occured) and that is why in some cases it can produce more output.
5.4 Iterative Suppression Automata
For iterative properties that are represented by a Policy automaton we propose a better
enforcement than outputting the longest valid prefix. We call it Iterative Suppression.
Since the property enforced is iterative, it describes good traces that consist of independent
parts, called “iterations”. The idea is that this enforcement mechanism is able to recognize
when a new good iteration can start, so it can suppress all the bad actions that happen
between the good iterations of a tentative execution.
5.4.1 Construction
A new semantics shown in Figure 5.8 is obtained from the previous construction (Fig-
ure 5.4) by changing the condition for the traces that cannot become good again, to be
1As we have defined on page 42, it is a sequence of actions such that there is not suffix that can make
it legal again.
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more precise we add new rules [Iteration-Out and Iteration-Wait] that can recog-
nize a beginning of a new iteration.
We start with the Policy automaton A = 〈Σ, Q, q0, δ, F 〉 representing the security
property. The states of Iterative Suppression automaton are composed from two states
of the Policy automaton: Q = {(q, qF )|q ∈ QP ∪ {q⊥}, qF ∈ F P}, where q = qF if q ∈ F P ,
or q 6= qF if there exists a run σ such that qF is the last accepting state before reaching q.
According to our assumption (see Remark 5.2.1), the initial state of the Policy automaton
is accepting, hence the initial state of the Iterative Suppression automaton is (q0, q0).
We propose this construction of the state because an edit automaton has to “remem-
ber” the last accepting state visited during the run and compare the tentative execution
to the new iterations starting only from that last visited accepting state.
Premises of the rules [Iteration-Out and Iteration-Wait] correspond to the case
when the next action a is not an action recognized by the Policy automaton but this action
can start a new iteration from the last visited accepting state qF . Then, if transition on
(qF , a) brings to an accepting state q
′ of the Policy automaton, then a is immediately
output and the memory is empty; next state is (q′, q′). If next incoming action a is not
accepted, then the memory is cleaned and only a is added to the memory. If a is not
starting a new iteration (rule [Error]), then there is a transition to an error state and
action a is not kept in the memory.
The main difference with Longest-valid-prefix automaton is that our automaton is able
to recognize new good iterations and suppress only actions that caused violation of the
property. We will show how the Longest-valid-prefix automaton enforces a market policy
from Section 3.1 and a drug selection process from the case study of Section 3.2.
In our previous work [17] we required that all good iterations must have a unique start-
ing action – an action that never repeats again in the iteration. We have then explained
in our follow-up work [15] that even if there is no unique starting action, the iterative
suppression automaton still soundly and transparently enforces iterative properties. If an
action a can start a new iteration and also appears in the middle of another iteration,
our construction will first build the transitions that repeat the Policy automaton (rules
[Good-Out] and [Good-Wait]) and for the rest of the cases will check whether a can
start a new iteration.
Even though it is not necessary to have unique starting actions, we think it is interest-
ing to compare our mechanism for the properties with and without it. In both cases the
mechanism is sound and transparent (as we prove below), but the modification of the in-
valid sequences will be done somewhat differently. Imagine a property where all the good
traces match the pattern (a; b; a; c)∗. Now consider a tentative execution a; b; (a; b; a; c).
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Good-Out
q
a−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P
((q, qF ), a;σi;σk)
σk;a
↪→ ((q′, q′), σi, ·)
Good-Wait
q
a−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P
((q, qF )a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF ), σi, σk; a)
Error
Otherwise
((q, qF ), a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q⊥, qF ), σi, ·)
Iteration-Out
q
a−→ ⊥ qF a−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P
((q, qF ), a;σi, σk)
a
↪→ ((q′, q′), σi, ·)
Iteration-Wait
q
a−→ ⊥ qF a−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P
((q, qF ), a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF ), σi, a)
The semantic rules in the upper part of the figure are those from the Longest-valid-prefix automaton
construction and we keep them without changes. Two rules in the lower part of the figure represent
recognition of iterations. Here and in the next similar figures the [Error] rule should be the last one in
the list of rules, but we keep it in the upper part of the figure to underline the similarity with other
constructions in this thesis.
Figure 5.8: Semantics for Iterative Suppression automaton constructed from the Policy
automaton.
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After processing a; b; a, on the next input action b our mechanism will make a transition
to the error state (since it is expecting c to arrive) and exit this state only on the third
action a. So the output will be empty. If the pattern did not have the second a inside (for
example, a; b; d; c) and an execution would be a; b; (a; b; d; c) then our mechanism would
recognize that the second a actually starts a new iteration, so the output will be a; b; d; c.
However, we did not find in practice the repetition of initial actions. This is somewhat
obvious: different execution patterns corresponds to execution of different macro-processes
in real life and thus different starting points: starting an HIV drug dispensation process
to an outpatient or a transplant process are different and the eventual dispensation of
a drug in a transplant process to an inpatient is intrinsically a different action for our
stakeholders.
Interestingly, this observation is not always true for other actions in the process.
The doctor can repeat some actions because a process in the medical organization, may
contain different sub-processes that can be repeated. Even if this observation is valid
in some particular cases of particular processes, we do not discuss it later in the thesis
because we do not want an enforcement mechanism to find a first half of an iteration A
separately from the last part of an iteration B and concatenate them. This concatenation
can bring liability if, for example, the first half of one iteration A was not finished and
done by a nurse, and another iteration B was not done correctly in the first half of B,
but was complaint in its second half and B was done by a doctor.
5.4.2 Formal Properties
We now prove the properties of the enforcement mechanism that we propose to construct
following the semantics from Figure 5.8.
Proposition 5.4.1 An Iterative Suppression automaton with semantics from Figure 5.8
for an iterative property P̂ represented by Policy automaton AP is sound and transparent
enforcement mechanism according to P̂ .
Proof. Given a Policy automaton AP let us construct an edit automaton E with se-
mantics from Figure 5.8. Now let us show that automaton E satisfies soundness and
transparency according to property P̂ .
Let us assume that state q is a state of the automaton AP after executing sequence
σ, and a is the next incoming action. Let us assume that invariant Inve(σ) stating that
P̂ (E(σ)) and if P̂ (σ) then E(σ) = σ holds and prove that Inve(σ; a) holds for any action
a.
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Initially Inve(·) holds because automaton has not output anything so far and · is valid.
Let us assume that Inve(σ) holds and prove that Inve(σ; a) holds as well in any possible
case.
1) If P̂ (σ; a), then there is an accepting run of AP on σ; a. In this case the output of E
is σk; a (rule [Good-Out]). The memory σk was obtained in a following way. Every
time when the non-accepting state is reached, the action is kept in the memory (rule
[Good-Wait]), and when finally the sequence becomes valid, a corresponding state
of AP is accepting and is reached thus the memory of E contains all the read actions.
Hence, the output in this case will be σ; a and Inve(σ; a) holds.
2) If σ; a is invalid but not irremediable then while executing σ the path in E will corre-
spond to the path in AP , to be more precise, for every transition q
σ[i]−−→ q′ of the policy
automaton, there will be a transition (q, σ[i, ..], σk)
τo
↪→ (q′, σ[i + 1, ..], τk), where τo, τk
are either a pair ·, σk;σ[i] or a pair σk;σ[i], ·. Therefore, only rules [Good-Wait] and
[Good-Out] will be used. By doing so E will output the longest valid prefix and
memory of E will contain all the not yet output actions that make a trace bad. Hence
Inve(σ; a) holds.
3) If σ; a is irremediable then let E(σ; a) = σo. According to the semantics, E outputs a
sequence of actions σk; a only when a corresponding state of the Policy automaton is
reached (rule Good-Out), otherwise it does not produce any output. Since property
P̂ is iterative, the good sequences consist of repeated iterations, and in our construction
the only way to produce an output, is to keep in the memory all the actions that are
accepted by an iteration in the Policy automaton (that starts in the initial state). This
means that an output σo consists of valid iterations, hence, Inve(σ; a) holds.
Therefore, in all the cases the invariant Inve(σ; a) is maintained and hence the edit
automaton E with semantics from Figure 5.8 satisfies soundness and transparency. 
5.4.3 Enforcement of the Market Policy
Let us show the difference in the enforcement done by the Longest-valid-prefix automaton
and the Iterative Suppression automaton for market policy. We have presented the policy
automaton for the market policy from Section 3.1 in Figure 5.2 and the Longest-valid-
prefix automaton in Figure 5.7. Now we will build an Iterative Suppression automaton
for this policy following the semantics from Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.9: Resulting Iterative Suppression automaton for the Policy automaton for mar-
ket policy.
The resulting edit automaton is shown in Figure 5.9. For the sake of readability we
show an Iterative Suppression automaton for the subset of the original set of actions:
{take(1), pay(1), take(2), pay(2), browse}. We demonstrate all the outgoing transi-
tions only from the state q1 and only some of the transitions from other states for the
same reason.
Now we can see that the sequences 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10 from the Section 3.1 can be
transformed in a more desirable way. In Table 5.1 we show the difference in the output of
Longest-valid-prefix automaton that we have constructed from the previous section and
the Iterative Suppression automaton.
We can see that the output produced by Iterative Suppression automaton is more
desirable since whenever the amount of paid items and taken items is the same, this part
of the execution is output. Both automata obey the properties of soundness and trans-
parency. This example shows again that soundness and transparency are not sufficient to
distinguish between the execution sequence transformer, as we have stated in Issue 3.
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Table 5.1: Difference in enforcement of market policy by Longest-valid-prefix automaton
and Iterative Suppression automaton
No Input Output
Longest-valid-prefix au-
tomaton from Figure 5.7
Iterative Sup-
pression au-
tomaton from
Figure 5.9
4 take(1); pay(1) take(1); pay(1) take(1); pay(1)
6 take(1); browse; pay(2) · ·
8 take(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) · pay(2); take(2)
9 take(1); pay(2); take(2) · pay(2); take(2)
10 pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) · pay(2); take(2)
5.4.4 Enforcement of the Drug Selection Process
In Figure 5.3 we have shown the policy automaton for the drug selection process. We will
use it in the construction of Iterative Suppression automaton for this example.
We will show the difference between the enforcement by a Longest-valid-prefix au-
tomaton and Iterative Suppression automaton. We have constructed a Longest-valid-
prefix automaton with the semantics from Figure 5.4. It is partially shown in Figure 5.10
(we show all transitions from the states q4, q6, q⊥). It is easy to see that this automaton
outputs the longest valid prefix: as soon as some wrong action happens (e.g. after defined
that drug is for research Dr, no research protocol number is inserted !Irpn in state q4) the
automaton leads to an error state and there are no outcoming transitions from that state.
While running the drug selection process, a tentative execution consists of 3 iterations,
one per each drug.
1. The first iteration is Dis; TnNn; Dr; Irpn; Ipd; Das, which is legal. We denote this
iteration by ResearchRun.
2. The second iteration is Dis; TnNn; Dr; Ipd; Das, which is illegal. It means that
the drug is submitted to Research program (Dr action) but the research protocol
number is not inserted (there is no Irpn action after Dr action). We denote this
iteration by SkipResearchProt.
3. The third iteration in Dis; Tnn; Rtn, DNr; Ipd; Das, which is a legal iteration. We
denote this iteration by NoteRun.
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Figure 5.10: Longest-valid-prefix automaton constructed from the Policy automaton for
drug selection process.
Figure 5.11: Iterative Suppression automaton constructed from the Policy automaton for
drug selection process.
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Table 5.2: Difference in enforcement of the drug selection process by Longest-valid-prefix
automaton and Iterative Suppression automaton
No. Input Output
Longest-valid-prefix
automaton from Fig-
ure 5.10
Iterative Suppression
automaton from Fig-
ure 5.11
1 ResearchRun ResearchRun ResearchRun
2 SkipResearchProt · ·
3 NoteRun NoteRun NoteRun
1;
2;
3
ResearchRun;
SkipResearchProt;
NoteRun
ResearchRun ResearchRun; NoteRun
The resulting trace is illegal since it has an irremediably bad second part. How can the
mechanism modify such execution? In Table 5.2 we show the results of transformation of
these iterations and their concatenation.
5.4.5 Enforcement of an Anonymization Policy
We here show the difference between the constructions of enforcement mechanisms used
in this chapter by means of enforcing some practical security policies. We discuss two
examples of rather intuitive anonymization policy.
Example 5.4.1 No non-anonymized personally identifiable data (pid) may leave the sys-
tem without notification.
Example 5.4.2 No non-anonymized personally identifiable data (pid) may leave the sys-
tem.
Even though these to policies look similar, they have a completely different semantics.
The first policy says that some non-anonymized pid is still allowed to leave the system,
but the notification must be shown to the user. The second policy forbids any sending
of non-anonymized pid. In our case study our colleagues from HSR would have a strong
preference over these two policies: they rather prefer to have a policy that does not
allow any leakage of non-anonymized pid (Example 5.4.2). We refer an interested reader
to [37], where File F framework requires that the patients’ data must be anonymized if
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previously requested by the patient. Then, the report containing anonymized data can
be sent outside the hospital.
Let us first simplify the model of the system and its events just to give a brief example.
Assume that the only events that are relevant to the security policies are:
SendA Send anonymized data
SendN Send non-anonymized data
Notif Execution of notification
Enforcement of Example 5.4.1 policy
This policy can be enforced in different ways. One way is suppressing of events corre-
sponding to sending non-anonymization data (SendN); another way is a modification of
these events (for example, by anonymizing the data); and another way is an insertion
of an event corresponding to the execution of a notification (Notif) as soon as the non-
anonymized data is sent. All alternatives are possible, however not all of them are equally
acceptable by the stake holders.
The security policy of Example 5.4.1 specifies that only sequences of a particular form
((SendN;Notif)|SendA)∗ are valid, hence sequences SendN;Notif and SendA are valid itera-
tions. Assume that once a non-anonymized left the system without the notification (that
violates the policy) and then the next data left the system anonymized. The sequence of
actions corresponding to this example is SendN; SendA.
The Longest-valid-prefix automaton will output the longest valid prefix, which in this
case is an empty trace. The Iterative Suppression automaton will recognize that the first
event SendN is an unfinished trace, while the second event SendA is a trace itself, hence
it will output SendA.
We can see from this example that Iterative Suppression automaton provides better
enforcement of the given policy than the Longest-valid-prefix automaton, still we do not
claim that this enforcement result is the optimal one. Another way to enforce the given
policy is substitute sending of non-anonymized data by first anonymizing pid, and then
sending it. In order to provide such an enforcement, our mechanism should be able to add
events that were not in the original system beforehand, such as Anonym, which means
“Anonymize the personally identifiable data”. Then, an enforcement mechanism as a
sequence transformer can potentially replace SendN with Anonym; SendA.
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Figure 5.12: Output of the Longest-valid-prefix automaton (LA) and Iterative Suppression
automaton (EA) on the same tentative execution sequence.
Enforcement of Example 5.4.2 policy
This policy can also be enforced in two ways: by suppression of SendN events, or by
modification of these events (substitute SendN with Anonym; SendA). The security policy
of Example 5.4.2 specifies that only sequences of the form SendA∗ are valid. Like in
previous example, the invalid sequence SendN; SendA will be transformed by a Longest-
valid-prefix automaton into an empty sequence and by Iterative Suppression automaton
into a sequence of one action SendA. Similarly to previous case, there is another way to
enforce this policy by replacing SendN with Anonym; SendA. We shall come back to this
example in the next chapter.
5.4.6 Discussion
In Figure 5.11 we partially show the result of the Iterative Suppression automaton con-
struction for the same Policy automaton according to the semantics from Figure 5.8. For
an easier comparison, we also emphasize the outcoming transitions from the states q4, q6
and q⊥. This automaton also leads to an error state as soon as something bad happens,
however it is able to recognize the beginning of a new good iteration which gives this
automaton the power of producing more output for the same bad input.
Let us show in Figure 5.12 the output of the Longest-valid-prefix automaton and itera-
tive suppression automaton for the same policy that is represented by a Policy automaton
in Figure 5.3. The input contains 5 iterations corresponding to the drug selection process.
The reader is already acquainted with the first 3 of them - they are the same as in the
Section 5.4.4. Iterations 1, 3 and 5 are valid, and iterations 2 and 4 are invalid, hence
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the whole input is not valid and is irremediable. However, for iterations 1, 3 and 5 the
Doctor managed to proceed successfully so there are three legal substrings: iterations 1,
3 and 5.
The Longest-valid-prefix automaton shown in Figure 5.10 outputs only the first iter-
ation. It means that Doctor will successfully complete selection process only for the first
drug. The Iterative Suppression automaton shown in Figure 5.11 will output all three
successful iterations.
Future direction
As a more general approach, we can consider the case of actions that cannot be corrected.
We call these actions observable actions. For instance, in a business processes they cor-
respond to outsourced services, where actions can only be logged. It is possible to have
observable actions also within an organization; for example when a doctor is preparing
a set of drugs for a specific patient, he takes a wrong drug from a stock, and it is not
possible to delete this physical action. It could be modeled as a special kind of Iterative
suppression automaton that cannot suppress observable actions.
We can also consider the case of multiple users and define behavior of enforcement
mechanism in that case. Indeed, many doctors may try to dispense drugs at the same
time, and construction of enforcement mechanism can be different. We also leave this
problem for future work.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we first introduced additional notations and assumptions about the rep-
resentation of the security policy made in this thesis: the security policy is presented as
a Policy automaton, which is an automaton that combines the acceptance conditions of
finite-state automaton and Bu¨chi automaton.
We proposed a construction of the Longest-valid-prefix automaton from the security
policy represented as a Policy automaton. The Longest-valid-prefix automaton is a par-
ticular kind of edit automaton that always outputs the longest valid prefix of the tentative
execution sequence.
We have presented a construction of a new kind of edit automaton, called Iterative
suppression automaton, that is able to recognize valid iterations of the tentative executions
and suppress the actions between the valid iterations.
By providing these two constructions, we have addressed Issue 2: we have a new generic
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construction for two kinds of edit automata: one outputs the longest valid prefix of the
input and another one outputs more than the longest valid prefix in case the execution
sequence is invalid.
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Chapter 6
Predictable Enforcement and
Error-Toleration
The current theory of runtime enforcement is based on two notions: sound-
ness and transparency. Soundness defines that the output is always good and
transparency defines that good input is not changed. In this chapter we pro-
pose a new notion of predictability that ensures that there are ”no surprises
on bad input”. We address the problem policy of enforcement when the users
make insignificant errors and would like to continue the process execution. We
present a novel approach for constructing enforcement mechanism that tolerate
user errors.
6.1 Predictability of Enforcement
As we have seen in the example of market policy from Section 3.1, on the example of
drug dispensation process from Section 3.2, and later example of simple anonymization
policy from Section 5.4.5, the same security property can be enforced in different ways.
Currently, the only formal notions that describe the behavior of enforcement mechanism
are soundness and transparency (that together form a notion of effective=enforcement).
In our opinion a new notion should be proposed that describes the behavior of runtime
enforcer when the execution sequence is invalid (in case it’s valid, it should not be changed
according to transparency). In this section we propose a new notion that addresses Issue 3.
Recall the example of drug selection process from Section 3.2. The set of expected
execution sequences corresponding to this process that were presented on page 36 form a
security policy P .
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SimpleRun Dis; TnNn; DNr; Dpres,
NoteRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; DNr; Dpres,
ResearchRun Dis; TnNn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
NoteResearchRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
and their closure under concatenation: for every σ, σ′ ∈ P : σ;σ′ ∈ P . Notice that an
empty trace NoRun also satisfies the policy.
Let us now make some examples of invalid traces with respect to the policy P .
Example 6.1.1 The doctors might forgot to click the “I have read the Therapeutical
Note” button and rather close the window (Ctw). A similar event could happen for the
step in which research protocol numbers are not inserted (Cpw), or he might skip all steps
altogether. For example, these alternatives give us the following traces
CloseProt Dis; TnNn; Dr; Cpw; Dpres
SkipAll Dis; Dr; Dpres
CloseNoteProt Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Cpw; Dpres
Figure 6.1 graphically shows a behavior of enforcement mechanism that is sound and
transparent with respect to some security property P̂ . Execution sequences that are
intercepted by a runtime enforcer are shown on the left side of the figure and marked with
Σ∞. The resulting outputs of runtime enforcer are shown on the right side and marked
with T∞. The gray area denotes invalid sequences and the white area denotes valid ones
with respect to P̂ .
Transparency means that the traces in the white area of the input are mapped into
the same traces (at the same position) in the white area of the output. Soundness means
that all the traces shall be mapped into the white area. However, it is not specified where
exactly the points from gray area are mapped.
The valid traces ResearchRun and NoteResearchRun are mapped into the same traces
(numbers 1 and 4 in the figure), which corresponds to transparency. Invalid traces
CloseProt, SkipAll and CloseNoteProt (number 2, 3 and 5 in the figure) are mapped into
some good traces that can be chosen arbitrarily.
Notice that our definition of transparency uses a notion of identity relation instead
of semantic-equvalence relation that was originally proposed [7] (see Section 4.3.3 for
definitions of soundness and transparency). That is why valid traces are mapped into the
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Abbreviations
1 - ResearchRun
2 - CloseProt
3 - SkipAll
4 - NoteResearchRun
5 - CloseNoteProt
This mechanism is transparent since the valid executions ResearchRun and NoteResearchRun are not
modified – they are in the same point in the output space T∞. The mechanism is also sound, hence
all the remaining invalid executions can be transformed into any point in the white (good) part of the
output space.
Figure 6.1: Sound and Transparent enforcement mechanism.
same points in Figure 6.1. The reason for this decision is that it is not possible to define a
semantics that can be used in all application domains. Recently, Khoury and Tawbi [47]
discussed possible semantics of this relation, however they also proposed some concrete
definitions for concrete domains. Ligatti and Reddy [52] have proposed the notion of
completeness instead. It can be easily shown that transparency implies completeness and
since transparency is necessary here, we don’t discuss it further.
Figure 6.1 explicitly shows that the notions of soundness and transparency are not
sufficient to distinguish between different enforcement mechanisms and to identify whether
one mechanism provides a better enforcement than another one. We think that a new
notion will help to answer these questions.
6.1.1 Metrics and Distances
In order to introduce a new notion we recall the definitions of metrics and metric spaces.
These concepts in this thesis are adapted from [4, 29].
Definition 6.1.1 A metric on a set S is a function d : S × S → R ∪ {∞} such that
(a) non− negativity : d(σ, τ) ≥ 0,
(b) identity : d(σ, τ) = 0 if and only if σ = τ ,
(c) symmetry: d(σ, τ) = d(τ, σ),
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(d) triangular inequality: d(σ, τ) ≤ d(σ, σ′) + d(σ′, τ).
The pair (S, d) is called a metric space and the number d(σ, τ) is called the distance
between the elements σ and τ . If all conditions but symmetry hold, then d is called a
quasi-metric.
When a distance is a finite number we can compare how far two situations (some po-
tentially illegal traces) are from the legal situation. For medical staff these two situations
can be perceived as qualitatively similar with a different degree of gravity. The notion of
∞ can be used to represent distance between traces perceived so qualitatively different
that they are incomparable. An example: a trace containing a wrong action compromising
the health of a patient is incomparable to any legal trace.
We discuss here some concrete metrics and quasi-metrics that will be useful in com-
paring tentative execution sequences with the expected behavior of our running examples.
Definition 6.1.2 A suppressing distance dS(σ, σ
′) between two finite traces σ and σ′ is
a number of actions that must be suppressed from σ in order to get σ′. The total function
dS : Σ
∗ × Σ∗ → N ∪ {∞} is a quasi-metric, such that
dS(σ, σ
′) =

∞ if σ = · and σ′ 6= ·
|σ| if σ′ = ·
dS(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + dS(σa, bσb) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = bσb and a 6= b
(6.1)
Notice that the distance between sequences σ and σ′ is ∞ when |σ| < |σ′| because no
number of suppressions can transform σ into σ′. Another non-trivial rule is the last case
in the equation 6.1: if the first actions of the two sequences are different then the action
in the first sequence is suppressed and comparison continues.
The intuition behind suppression is that a bad trace is close to a good trace if the
actions we have to undo are few.
Let us come back to our case study of the drug selection process (more generically, we
can also consider other workflows of the hospital). The idea of suppression distance can
be explained to the operator in the hospital and can be acceptable for an administrative
procedure (albeit annoying for the operator involved). For example, the monitor could
block the process if the number of bad actions exceeds a given threshold or, preferably, it
could undo all bad actions bringing us back to the point where we started the transaction
that has gone awry. More concretely, see the following example.
92
6.1. PREDICTABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT
Example 6.1.2 A doctor is selecting a drug (Dis) for which therapeutical notes are needed
(Tnn). However at the time to review them, he is interrupted (e.g. in case of an emer-
gency, interruption by another colleague etc.). When he comes back, he has to start
running the process again because it timed out. The second time the doctor successfully
finishes the process (he executes the sequence NoteResearchRun). So, his tentative exe-
cution σ is Dis; Tnn; NoteResearchRun and the distance to one of the good traces σ′=
NoteRun is
dS((Dis;Tnn;NoteResearchRun),NoteResearchRun) = 2 (6.2)
Notice that the distance from the legal sequence NoteResearchRun to the illegal tentative se-
quence Dis; Tnn; NoteResearchRun is ∞ because no number of suppressions can transform
the legal trace into the illegal one.
Similarly, the distance between this tentative sequence and another legal sequence,
for example the distance between σ = Dis;Tnn;NoteResearchRun and σ′ = NoteRun=
Dis;Tnn;Rtn;DNr;Dpres, is also∞ because tentative execution is shorter than the expected
legal one.
In the next example we can see that even suppressing distance already discriminates
between different run-time enforcement mechanisms.
Example 6.1.3 If an enforcement mechanism used to enforce the drug selection process
is the Longest-valid prefix automaton (marked as ELA), then it will transform every ten-
tative execution sequence to its longest valid prefix, hence for tentative sequence Dis;Tnn;
NoteRun (from Example 6.1.2), we have ELA(Dis;Tnn; NoteRun) = ·. The expected be-
havior in this case is a sequence NoteRun, and ELA( NoteRun) = NoteRun. Hence, if
we compare the results of the Longest-valid-prefix automaton ELA for tentative execution
sequence and for an expected one, we have:
dS(ELA(Dis;Tnn;NoteRun), ELA(NoteRun)) = dS(·,NoteRun) =∞ (6.3)
An Iterative Suppression automaton (marked as EIS, see Section 5.4 for more details)
would have suppressed the illegal initial prefix and recognize a valid iteration NoteRun:
EIS(σ) = EIS(Dis;Tnn; NoteRun) = NoteRun, and the suppressing distance then is:
dS(EIS(Dis;Tnn; NoteRun), EIS( NoteRun)) = dS(NoteRun, NoteRun) = 0 (6.4)
To distinguish between more enforcement mechanisms we use another metric that
counts the number of replaced actions.
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Let us come back again to the example of drug dispensation process. While enforcing
a process in the hospitals, an enforcement mechanism could be entitled only to correcting
small errors without changing the protocol used by the operators (such as patient identifi-
cation, patient consent and blood sampling before blood transfusion). If the doctor forgot
to fill one field in the form, the mechanism can insert a default value. On the other hand,
insertions of new steps by the enforcement mechanism to compensate a bad event are not
be allowed because a different protocol might have different medical or legal consequences
and those can only be judged by an expert.
Definition 6.1.3 The replacing distance dR(σ, σ
′) between two finite traces σ and σ′ is
a number of replacements that should be done in σ in order to get σ′. The total function
dR : Σ
∗ × Σ∗ → N ∪ {∞} is a metric, such that
dR(σ, σ
′) =

0 if σ = · and σ′ = ·
∞ if σ = · xor σ′ = ·
dR(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + dR(σa, σb) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = bσb and a 6= b
(6.5)
Notice that the distance is∞ if the tentative execution sequence and the expected one
have different length (it is expected because they clearly belong to different protocols).
A more general definition of distance was originally proposed by Levenshtein [50].
Definition 6.1.4 The Levenshtein distance dL(σ, σ
′) between two finite traces σ and σ′
is a number of insertions, suppressions and replacements needed to obtain σ′ from σ. The
total function dL : Σ
∗ × Σ∗ → N is a metric, such that
dL(σ, σ
′) =

|σ′| if σ = ·
|σ| if σ′ = ·
dL(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + min{dL(σa, σb), if σ = aσa and
dL(aσa, σb), dL(σa, bσb)} σ′ = bσb and a 6= b
(6.6)
Let us explain the difference between the Levenshtein distance and the replacing dis-
tance by means of example.
Example 6.1.4 Consider a case from Example 6.1.1, where the doctor forgot to read the
therapeutical notes and closed the window (he performed Ctw action instead of Rtn) and
the doctor did not insert the research protocol number (he performed Cpw instead of Irpn),
the corresponding tentative execution sequence is
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CloseNoteProt = Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Cpw; Dpres.
Suppose that an enforcement mechanism E leaves this sequence without changes. We
assume that E is transparent, so an already legal execution sequence
NoteResearchRun = Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres.
is not changed by E. Hence, if we compare the output of an enforcement mechanism E
by means of replacing distance dR and Levenshtein distance dL, we get:
dR(E(CloseNoteProt), E(NoteResearchRun)) = dR(CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) = 2
dL(E(CloseNoteProt), E(NoteResearchRun)) = dL(CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) = 2
Replacing distance in this case is equal to the Levenshtein distance.
Example 6.1.5 Let us consider the sequence CloseProt = Dis; TnNn; Dr; Cpw; Dpres(where
the doctor only did not insert a research protocol number). Assume that an enforcement
mechanism E does not change this execution sequence, and it is transparent, so it does
not change the legal execution NoteResearchRun = Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres.
Then,
dR(E(CloseProt), E(NoteResearchRun)) = dR(CloseProt,NoteResearchRun) =∞
because NoteResearchRun is simply longer than CloseProt (and belongs to another process
execution where theraperutical notes are not needed). But the Levenshtein distance counts
the inserted and replaced actions and the distance is
dL(E(CloseProt), E(NoteResearchRun)) = dL(CloseProt,NoteResearchRun) = 3
We present the Levenshtein distances between the execution sequences for our running
example of drug selection process in Table 6.1.
6.1.2 From Sound to Bounded Enforcement Mechanisms
Building on metrics over the sequences, we propose to use the notions from measure
theory for enforcement mechanisms. In the following definitions (Σ∞ ∪T∞, d) is a metric
space, a map E : Σ∞ → T∞ is an enforcement mechanism and a security policy is a
set P ⊆ Σ∞ ∩ T∞. As a starting point we assume that all runtime enforcers satisfy the
transparency property.
In the context of our running example, transparency of an enforcement mechanism has
the following meaning. The actions in the systems corresponds to actions of doctors and
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Table 6.1: The Levenshtein distances between some sequences
NoRun ResearchRun CloseProt SkipAll NoteResearchRun CloseNoteProt
NoRun 0 5 5 3 6 6
ResearchRun 5 0 1 2 2 3
CloseProt 5 1 0 2 3 2
SkipAll 3 2 2 0 3 3
NoteResearchRun 6 2 3 3 0 2
CloseNoteProt 6 3 2 3 2 0
NoteRun 5 3 3 3 2 3
nurses (or administrative staff), who are knowledgeable and accountable for their actions.
Their point of view is that the choice of a legitimate course of action is due to a contextual
knowledge not available to the system. A system that would change their decisions, when
those actions conform to the policy of the hospital, would be unacceptable.
The next step is generalizing the notion of soundness. We start from a classical
definition of bounded map that Figure 6.2 shows graphically. Even though the division
of traces into good and bad is not relevant for the definition of boundedness, we keep it
in the figure to ease the comparison with other notions.
Definition 6.1.5 A function E : Σ∞ → T∞ is bounded if the subset {E(σ) : σ ∈ Σ∞} ⊆
T∞ is bounded. Formally,
∃τ ∈ T∞ : ∃ε > 0 : ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : d(E(σ), τ) ≤ ε (6.7)
Let us project this notion to the theory of enforcement mechanisms. We get a mech-
anism that transforms all sequences to some sequence close to τ . This is not what users
are expecting. The user’s policy usually contains several good sequences, hence we should
adapt the definition to map bad sequences to different good sequences in the policy.
Definition 6.1.6 An enforcement mechanism E : Σ∞ → T∞ is bounded within ε if and
only if
∃σP ∈ P : ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : d(E(σ), E(σP )) ≤ ε. (6.8)
This notion says that an output of enforcement mechanism is always within the distance ε
from some good execution, for ε > 0 we are weakening the notion of soundness. Figure 6.3
shows the bounded within ε enforcement mechanism.
There is a fundamental difference between boundedness and boundedness within ε.
Boundness means that there is one single trace τ in the possible outputs such that all
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Abbreviations
1 - ResearchRun
2 - CloseProt
3 - SkipAll
4 - NoteResearchRun
5 - CloseNoteProt
6 - NoteRun
This enforcement mechanism is bounded because there exists a point 6 in the output space such that all
the outputs of the enforcement mechanism are within some radius from this point.
Figure 6.2: Bounded map.
Abbreviations
1 - ResearchRun
2 - CloseProt
3 - SkipAll
4 - NoteResearchRun
5 - CloseNoteProt
This mechanism is bounded within ε since for every execution of the process there exists some point in
the output space that is at distance ε from some valid point (in this case it’s either 1 or 4).
Figure 6.3: Bounded within ε enforcement mechanism.
the outputs of E are in the radius ε from τ . Boundedness within ε means that for every
possible output there is a valid trace such that the distance between them is smaller or
equal than ε.
Example 6.1.6 An enforcement mechanism E enforces the drug dispensation process in
the following way :
E(CloseNoteProt) = CloseNoteProt
E(SkipAll) = CloseNoteProt
E(CloseProt) = NoteRun
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Abbreviations
1 - ResearchRun
2 - CloseProt
3 - SkipAll
4 - NoteResearchRun
5 - CloseNoteProt
This mechanism is conditionally bounded within ε because only point 2 that is close to the valid point
1, is mapped into a point within ε from some valid point 4. Notice that this mapping is allowed by the
definition. The other points, that are not close enough to 1 or 4, can be mapped to arbitrary valid points
(just to satisfy soundness).
Figure 6.4: Conditionally bounded within ε enforcement mechanism.
The smallest distance from E(σ) to some good sequence is:
dL(CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) = 2
dL(NoteRun,NoteResearchRun) = 2
Since the output of E is always at distance 2 from some good execution NoteRe-
searchRun then E is bounded within ε = 2.
We can refine the notion by imposing also that “almost valid traces” should be mapped
to some “almost valid traces”. We call it conditional boundedness within ε and show
graphically in Figure 6.4.
Definition 6.1.7 An enforcement mechanism E : Σ∞ → T∞ is conditionally bounded
within ε if and only if
∃δ > 0 : ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : (∃σ′P ∈ P : d(σ, σ′P ) ≤ δ ⇒ ∃σP ∈ P : d(E(σ), E(σP )) ≤ ε). (6.9)
Example 6.1.7 An enforcement mechanism E transforms the sequences of actions in the
following way :
E(CloseNoteProt) = CloseProt
E(SkipAll) = NoRun
E(CloseProt) = NoteRun
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The smallest distance from E(σ) to some good sequence is:
dL(CloseProt,ResearchRun) = 1
dL(NoRun,NoRun) = 0
dL(NoteRun,NoteRun) = 0
Obviously, E is bounded within ε = 1. It is conditionally bounded within ε = 1 because
there is a δ = 3 such that for every sequence there is a valid trace at most at distance 3:
dL(CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) = 2
dL(SkipAll,NoRun) = 3
dL(CloseProt,ResearchRun) = 1
Boundedness and conditional boundedness can refine soundness but are still unaccept-
able: when a doctor performs an execution CloseProt where he closes the window instead
of inserting the protocol (instead of executing ResearchRun), an enforcement mechanism
may transform his tentative execution CloseProt into another, completely different one
(execution NoteRun). The problem is that some actions in the outcome are not a direct
transformation of the actions of the doctors. Since actions carry liabilities it is impor-
tant that the modifications made by an enforcement mechanism are always linked to
corresponding actions by the doctor.
6.1.3 Predictability
Our notion of predictability within ε is inspired by the classical notion of continuous
functions. Let (Σ∞ ∪ T∞, d) and (Σ∞ ∪ T∞, d′) be metric spaces.
Definition 6.1.8 A map E : Σ∞ → T∞ is continuous if at every trace σ ∈ Σ∞ the
following holds:
∀ε > 0 : ∃δ > 0 : ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∞ : (d(σ, σ′) < δ ⇒ d′(E(σ), E(σ′)) < ε) (6.10)
In conditional boundedness we proposed to limit an output when an input is “almost
good”. But as we have seen from Figure 6.4, an input and its output should be compared
to the same valid trace.
Definition 6.1.9 An enforcement mechanism E is predictable within ε if for every trace
σP ∈ P the following holds:
∀ν ≥ ε : ∃δ > 0 : ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : (d(σ, σP ) ≤ δ ⇒ d′(E(σ), E(σP )) ≤ ν) (6.11)
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Abbreviations
1 - ResearchRun
2 - CloseProt
3 - SkipAll
4 - NoteResearchRun
5 - CloseNoteProt
We graphically show an execution sequence transformer that is predictable within ε. Indeed, we have two
valid executions: 1 and 4. Whenever a tentative execution is within some range δ from a valid execution,
e.g. 2 is in the range of 1, it is transformed into an execution within ε from this valid execution, e.g. 2
is transformed into a sequence close to 1. If an execution is “too far” from being valid, e.g. execution 3,
predictability does not define the way in which it should be transformed.
Figure 6.5: Predictable within ε enforcement mechanism
Informally, it says that for every valid trace there always exists a radius δ, such that
all the traces within this radius are mapped into the circle with radius ε from this trace.
We show it in Figure 6.5.
6.1.4 Examples of Enforcement Mechanisms
Enforcement mechanisms for market policy
Let us come back to the example of market policy from Example 3.1.1 and two enforcement
mechanisms for it:
• Longest-valid-prefix automaton from Section 5.3 (we denote it by ELA);
• Iterative Suppression automaton from Section 5.4 (we denote it by EIS).
First we analyze whether the Longest-valid-prefix automaton ELA is predictable within
some bound k and then try to find k. Without loss of generality, we will use the Leven-
shtein distance in these examples.
Recall that valid iterations for this policy are of the form (take(n); pay(n)) , or
browse, or (pay(n); browse∗; take(n)).
Consider a tentative execution σ = take(1); (pay(2); take(2))n. The Longest-valid-
prefix automaton always outputs the longest valid prefix of its input, hence ELA(σ) = ·.
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By the shape of σ we can see that there exists a legal trace σP = (pay(2); take(2))
n such
that
dL(σ, σP ) = dL(take(1); (pay(2); take(2))
n, (pay(2); take(2))n) = 1 ≤ δ
and this statement holds for all δ > 0.
Then, according to the definition of predictability, if there exists a bound ε, then for
all ν ≥ ε the following should hold: dL(ELA(σ), ELA(σP )) ≤ ν. However,
dL(ELA(σ), ELA(σP )) =
dL(ELA(take(1); (pay(2); take(2))
n), ELA((pay(2); take(2))
n)) =
dL(·, (pay(2); take(2))n) = 2n
Since n is not bounded, there is no bound ε for this mechanism, so this mechanism is
not predictable. It also matches the intuition behind predictability: an input σ is close
(within δ) from a valid trace σP , but ELA(σ) is not close to the same valid trace.
Let us now consider an Iterative Suppression automaton EIS. The same tentative
execution σ = take(1); (pay(2); take(2))n, is transformed into its longest subpart that
is correct: EIS(σ) = (pay(2); take(2))
n. Again, this execution is at distance 1 from a
valid trace σP = (pay(2); take(2))
n, and dL(σ, σP ) = 1 ≤ δ for any δ > 0.
We can find a bound ε for this enforcement mechanism if we make one assump-
tion: we assume that the distance we are using counts only a number of different el-
ements that are outside of the valid iterations. Let us establish a bound ε = k, then
all the traces that have up to k invalid actions (k actions outside of the valid itera-
tions), like σ = take(1)1; . . . ; take(1)k; (pay(2); take(2))
n, are transformed into σP =
(pay(2); take(2))n, therefore
d(EIS(σ), ELA(σP )) =
d(EIS(take(1)1; . . . ; take(1)k; (pay(2); take(2))
n), EIS((pay(2); take(2))
n)) =
d((pay(2); take(2))n, (pay(2); take(2))n) = 0
and hence, there always exists δ = ε = k such that equation (6.11) holds.
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Enforcement mechanism for drug selection process
Recall the enforcement mechanism E from Example 6.1.7:
E(CloseNoteProt) = CloseProt
E(SkipAll) = NoRun
E(CloseProt) = NoteRun
It was shown that this mechanism is conditionally bounded within ε = 1. However, it
is not predictable within ε = 1 because there exists σP = ResearchRun such that
∃ν = 2 : ∀δ > 0 : ∃σ = CloseProt :
(dL(σ, σP ) = dL(CloseProt,ResearchRun) = 1 ≤ δ ∧
dL(E(σ), E(σP )) = dL(E(CloseProt), E(ResearchRun)) =
dL(NoteRun,ResearchRun) = 3 > 2 = ν)
which means that
∃ν = 2 : ∀δ > 0 : ∃σ ∈ Σ∗ : (d(σ, σP ) ≤ δ ∧ d(E(σ), E(σP )) > ν)
Enforcement mechanism for an anonymization policy
Recall an anonymization policy from Example 5.4.2: “No non-anonymized personally
identiable data (pid) may leave the system.” Formally, we describe this policy as a set of
traces of the form SendA∗. We have proposed several enforcement mechanisms for this
policy:
1) whenever a non-anonymized pid is about to be sent, an enforcement mechanism sup-
pressed this event: the SendN event is suppressed. This can be done either by the
Longest-valid-prefix automaton (when the subsequent events are suppressed as well),
or by an Iterative Suppression automaton (subsequent events are not suppressed is
they are SendA).
2) whenever a a non-anonymized pid is about to be sent, an enforcement mechanism
suppresses this event, anonymizes the pid and then send it (SendN is substituted with
Anonym; SendA).
We denote the Iterative Suppression automaton with EIS. Consider a tentative exe-
cution sequence σ = SendN; SendA; SendA; SendN; ...; SendA with k actions SendN and m
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actions SendA. This sequence represents a general case for any illegal sequence since only
two actions SendA and SendN are relevant. For Iterative Suppression automaton we will
use the suppressing distance dS.
An Iterative Suppression automaton will suppress all bad iterations, i.e. all actions
SendN, hence
EIS(σ) = EIS(SendN; SendA; SendA; SendN; ...; SendA) = SendA; SendA; ...; SendA (6.12)
where the output sequence contains m actions SendA. Let us denote the output sequence
with σP . Then,
dS(EIS(σ), E(σP )) =
dS(EIS(SendN; SendA; SendA; SendN; ...; SendA), EIS(SendA; SendA; ...; SendA)) =
dS(EIS(SendA; SendA; ...; SendA), EIS(SendA; SendA; ...; SendA)) = 0
Therefore we conclude that
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : (dS(σ, σP ) ≤ δ ⇒ dS(EIS(σ), EIS(σP )) = 0 ≤ ν) (6.13)
where ν is an arbitrary positive number, and we can pick any δ, this statement holds for
all δ.
However, we get a different result if we use Levenshtein distance dL. Since we suppress
all the actions SendN, the distance between the outputs of EIS(σ) and EIS(σ
′) will not
be 0, but rather will be equal to the distance between the original sequences σ and σ′.
Now let us consider an enforcement mechanism E described in case 2). Any tentative
execution sequence of the form σ = SendN; SendA; SendA; SendN; ...; SendA with k actions
SendN and m actions SendA. We shall consider Levenshtein distance dL in this example.
Tentative sequence σ is transformed as follows by E:
E(σ) = E(SendN; SendA; SendA; SendN; ...; SendA) =
(Anonym; SendA); SendA; SendA; (Anonym; SendA)...; SendA
where the output sequence contains k actions Anonym and k +m actions SendA.
The biggest distance between the outputs of an enforcement mechanism in this exam-
ple is 2k. Assume that we compare the tentative execution σ with k actions SendN and m
actions SendA to a legal execution σP with only m actions SendA. Then, dL(σ, σP ) = k.
Our enforcement mechanism substitutes every SendN with Anonym; SendA, wich means
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Table 6.2: Properties of enforcement mechanism.
Name Pre-Condition Post-Condition
Soundness for every trace the output is always some
valid trace
Transparency if input is a valid trace output is the same valid trace
Bounded Map there is one valid trace such that output
is always within ε from that trace
Boundedness output is always within ε from some valid
trace
Conditional
Boundedness
if input is within δ
from some valid trace
output is within ε from some valid trace
Predictability if input is within δ
from a valid trace
output is within ε from the same valid
trace
that E(σ) contains k actions Anonym and k+m actions SendA, hence dL(E(σ), E(σ
′)) =
2k.
Notice that E(σ) always contains some actions Anonym and some actions SendA, hence
this mechanism will always enlarge the tentative execution σ by k elements, whenever σ
contains k actions SendN. Therefore, we can conclude that for a given ε we can always
find δ = ε/2, so the enforcement mechanism discussed above is predictable.
6.1.5 Discussion
Table 6.2 shows all the notions so far and the new notion of predictability. The main dif-
ference is that predictability has a pre-condition and post-condition that compare invalid
traces to the same valid trace.
Limitations
An apparent limitation of our work is that we don’t deal with infinite traces. We have
actually considered some mathematical functions over infinite traces from [27] but we
found a practical obstacle: the end of the fiscal year effectively terminates any trace in
the eyes of our stakeholders.
Let us discuss an example of a natural distance from [27] that has a clear mathematical
intuition for our domain and allow to obtain finite numbers when comparing infinite traces.
We can use an economic approach and consider the discounted distance that discounts
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the remote differences in the sequence :
Definition 6.1.10 The discounted distance between two infinite traces is a number cal-
culated using a total function dD : Σ
ω × Σω → N, such that
dD(σ, σ
′) =

|σ| if σ′ = ·
|σ′| if σ = ·
dD(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + 1
k
dD(σa, σb) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = bσb and a 6= b
(6.14)
In this definition k ∈ R, k 6= 0 is a discounting factor.
The first function can be acceptable from the perspective of a risk manager as later
events have less risk of being detected or of having consequences within the year. It is
less acceptable for doctors: a wrong drug is a wrong drug, no matter if delivered at the
beginning or the end of the fiscal year.
At the end the only acceptable metrics boils down to considering what happens during
a limited slot and project it to infinity. But then we could simply consider the finite slot.
Hence, the definition of mathematically simple and meaningful metrics for infinite traces
is still open for us (assuming we should consider them at all).
Sequence alignment in bioinformatics
In bioinformatics the comparison of two sequences of elements is called alignment. Se-
quence alignment compares sequences like DNA or RNA and identifies regions of similarity
that may be a consequence of functional, structural, or evolutionary relationships between
the sequences [56].
There is a large variety of alignment methods in bioinformatics. Exact alignment
methods done by dynamic programming are using constants of functions costs to the
following events: insertion, suppression, replacements and also matching between the two
elements of sequences. In these methods the distance between the sequences is a similarity
score between them (the higher the score, the better is matching). Another group of
alignment methods, called hybrid methods are used in cases when the downstream part
of one sequence overlaps with the upstream part of the other sequence. This case is not
useful in enforcement theory because we compare a valid sequence with invalid sequence
that contains some errors.
Suppression, replacement and even Levensein distance between the sequences is not
used in bioinformatics because these distances are purely syntactical (the cost of sup-
pressing one element of the sequence is exactly the same as the cost of suppressing any
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other element). In practice, to compute the similarity between two sequences like DNA
or RNA, either exact or hybrid methods are used with costs or functions that have some
semantics (for example, according to what has already been observed and statistically
measured between the organism(s) from which the sequences come from).
Other definitions of distances
So far we have used syntactical distances in our work. This approach is useful in case
when suppressing or replacing one action in the execution sequence has the same cost as
suppressing or replacing any other action. Our work can be extended using the constants
of functions costs assigned to actions. For example, in case of execution traces of business
processes, the risk manager can assign the costs to the action of her business process that
represent the risk associated with this action. In general, we think that it is possible to
assign costs to the actions in the execution trace depending on the context of the target
system, and we consider it one of the most natural extensions of our work.
As a very recent follow-up work, Banescu and Zannone [5] have proposed to use process
fitness metrics to assess the degree of compliance of an audit trial with a process model.
The authors revise the definition of Levenshtein distance with the metric Φ, representing
the severity of infringements. Given an element of a tentative execution sequence a and an
element of a valid trace b, Φ(a, b) defines the severity of the infringement that a happened
instead of b. Φ(a, b) depends on
• the reputation of the user performing the task a,
• the semantic distance between the task which is actually executed (task a) and the
task defined in the process specification (task b),
• is the semantic distance between the role of the user executing the task a and the
role associated to the task b in the specification, and
• the penalty due to unauthorized access to data during the execution of a task a.
The authors proposed to revise the Levenshtein distance as follows:
dΦL(σ, σ
′) =

Φ(·, b) + dΦL(σ, σb) if σ = · and σ′ = bσb
Φ(a, ·) + dΦL(σa, σ′) if σ′ = · and σ = aσa
dΦL(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
Φ(a, b) +min{dΦL(σa, σb), if σ = aσa and
dΦL(aσa, σb), d
Φ
L(σa, bσb)} σ′ = bσb and a 6= b
(6.15)
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This revised notion of Levenshtein distance can be one of the choices of the future
extensions of our work, where the severity of infringement reflected in the distance can
distinguish better between different enforcement mechanisms.
Future direction
One future direction can be the analysis of existing mechanisms to identify which one is
predictable. The practically interesting question is whether an ε for predictability can be
extracted from a security policy expressed as an automaton.
The second issue revolves around edit automata as an enforcement mechanism and the
characterization of predictable policies. A key question is whether policies of a certain form
do have always (or never) have predictable enforcement mechanism. Under some definition
of convexity we could prove that convex policies always have predictable enforcement
mechanisms within a bound fixed on the border, but this definition, while mathematically
sound, is not intuitive enough.
6.2 Enforcement Mechanism for Error-Tolerant Poli-
cies
As we have discussed earlier, security policies describe the desired behavior of the system
or the workflow. The end users of the workflow would insist on the only one policy
describing the official protocol workflow. Hence, when an insignificant deviation from the
official protocol happens, the current runtime enforcer would block the execution of such
process (or a part of it in case of Iterative Suppression automatonfrom Section 5.4). As we
presented in Issue 4, currently there is no generic algorithm that can construct a runtime
enforcer that tolerates user errors.
In order to exit from this impasse, we build upon the works of automatic policy gener-
ation and run-time enforcement to propose a semi-automatic way to generate enforcement
mechanisms that tolerate up to k errors given a texted “default” workflow and a specifi-
cation of a simple list of errors and possibly their corrections.
We present our idea in Figure 6.6. Given a policy P and a maximum number of
errors/deviations k, we construct a subclass of edit automata that can provably enforce
the given policy by tolerating up to k errors and whose behavior is predictable (see
Section 6.1).
Remark 6.2.1 We have an aside but important note on the terminology. Most papers
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Figure 6.6: Original approach and a novel approach to construction of enforcement mech-
anisms.
on enforcement mechanisms use the words “violation” rather than “error”. We will use
them interchangeably. In the course of our many interactions with Hospital San Raffaele
(HSR) 1, it has become apparent that the word “error” is preferred for psychological rea-
sons. The term “violation” implies that a doctor would deliberately ignore the steps of the
protocol and this implies for the end users a deliberate mistrust in their behavior by the
evil security department. Of course doctors (as any user) could misbehave but in order
to gain acceptance of the mechanisms it is preferable to present enforcement as a way to
support honest users rather than to deter malicious users.
6.2.1 Venial and Amendable Errors
By “error” we mean two types of deviations from the desired behavior:
• venial errors are not explicitly “allowed” by the policy, but they are not harmful;
• amendable errors are possible to be corrected at runtime.
Let us explain these notions by means of our example of drug selection process from
Section 3.2. Consider an action of reviewing the therapeutical notes by the doctor. While
such notes are important (as they contain information about allergies, unwanted interac-
tions etc.) they are normally updated very rarely and for frequently used drugs doctors
might “forget” to actually review them and just skip them by closing the window of drug
1This collaboration was done within the EU project MASTER (www.master-fp7.eu)
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Table 6.3: A policy and possible errors
Policy Error Number
of errors
Error
type
Correction
Sequences satisfy-
ing the description
of the process from
running example
Instead of reviewing
therapeutical notes
close the window
k errors
per day
Venial No correction
Research protocol
number is not in-
serted
Can be
corrected
Insert special
number for
audit
prescription instead of clicking the “Done” button. From the point of view of the medical
process this can be considered a venial error : we can tolerate few deviations in which
the logs showed that the doctor clicked “Ignore” rather than reviewed some of the most
commonly prescribed drugs. More technically, a sequence of actions corresponding to this
example is denoted as:
CloseNote: Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Irpn; Dpres
In this execution sequence instead of reviewing the therapeutical notes (Rtn), the doctor
closes the therapeutical notes window (Ctw).
On the other hand, the doctor should not be allowed to violate the policy systemati-
cally, nor we want to overcomplicate the definition of the policy with all possible ways to
treat venial errors. From a usability perspective we would just like to have a high level
view, for example allowing to close the window (Ctw) instead of reviewing the therapeu-
tical notes (Rtn) k times per day.
The enforcement mechanism we propose in this section does the rest automatically.
It allows the user to make “almost” correct actions only a limited number of times and
only if the errors are venial. We present Table 6.3, that can be made by an expert in the
application domain. This table defines which errors can be allowed and what number of
times.
The second example is inserting the research protocol number in the protocol window.
A doctor has to complete this step in order to proceed with the drug selection. After she
fills in this number, the reimbursement of the drug will be done by the clinical trial funds.
For all the drugs that are not for research the reimbursement later on is done by the
public authority as described in the File F procedure (for more details on this procedure,
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see Section 3.2). However, it might happen that the doctor skips the insertion of this
number. Technically, this would mean that the doctor closes the protocol window (Cpw)
instead of inserting research protocol number (Irpn):
CloseProt: Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Cpw; Dpres
In this case the drug reimbursement process will be done by the public authority
which cannot be considered a venial error since the whole reimbursement process for this
drug will be wrong (reimbursement will be done by a wrong party). The enforcement
mechanism would therefore need to generate an alert and “correct” the wrong step i.e.
inserting another special number that later will be used during the audit2.
In practice, different doctors can prescribe different drugs to different patients and we
would like to avoid that a local infringement of the policy (e.g. a doctor forgot to click
“I have reviewed the therapeutical notes”) hangs the entire process while enforcing this
policy.
Notice that we need the concept of a global policy (or a “default” protocol) and we
cannot spawn an enforcement mechanism for each doctor and patient pair. At first the
notion of venial errors would be trivial: in the individual prescription process there is at
most one venial error that could be made. Second and foremost, the hospital is liable as
a whole if too many errors are present. If all doctors are allowed one venial error in the
individual prescription, the hospital might end up with all processes without therapeutic
notes checklist and thus the venial error would become a systematic error leading to
potential lawsuits.
So we want to define how the executions where “something locally bad may happen”
can be enforced by tolerating errors. The errors, which are neither venial, nor amendable,
are always present and cannot be fixed in practice. For example, when the process involves
the interactions of an organization with another one; for instance we can refer to the cases
of outsourcing services or to the cases in which some actions are done by external parties.
In practice the policy is given implicitly by describing the workflow corresponding to
legal executions (as we have shown in Example 3.2.1). Let us remind the good executions
according to the drug selection process.
SimpleRun Dis; TnNn; DNr; Dpres,
NoteRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; DNr; Dpres,
2In the real implementation systems are not allowed to automatically perform certain actions as the
final liability must stay with a human, however they can support the human by suggesting the relevant
correction.
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Table 6.4: Examples of errors and their characteristics
# Deviation e Expected action ex(e) Correction c(e)
1 e a e
2 e a b
3 b a b
Table 6.5: Almost bad traces that can be corrected
# Trace Expected enforcement
1 Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Irpn; Dpres Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Irpn; Dpres
2 Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Cpw; Dpres Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; InA; Dpres
3 Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Cpw; Dpres Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; InA; Dpres
ResearchRun Dis; TnNn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
NoteResearchRun Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres
Recall the examples of illegal executions for this process from Example 6.1.1:
CloseNote Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Irpn; Dpres,
CloseProt Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Cpw; Dpres,
CloseNoteProt Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Cpw; Dpres
For every possible deviation/error from the legal behavior we propose the following
table with the following functions. A function ex(e) defines an expected action in the
legal trace when an error e occurred and a function c(e) defines a correction for an error
e. Assuming that action e is an error and action a is an expected action of the policy,
there are few alternatives summarized in Table 6.4.
Correction c(e) = e (line 1) means that e is a venial error and it can be tolerated by
an enforcement mechanism. A case when c(e) = b (where a 6= b in line 2) means that e is
not a venial error, but there is a possible correction b that is by itself a venial error (line
3).
Let us come back to the example of drug selection process. Table 6.5 contains traces
that can be slightly changed and then be accepted by the end users as good traces. It
can be done in two ways: by allowing a venial error to occur (meaning c(e) = e) and by
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correcting it (c(e) 6= e). Venial error can occur instead of an action defined by the policy
and is “harmless”, so in our example venial error is to close the therapeutical notes window
(Ctw) instead of reviewing the notes (Rtn), formally ex(Ctw) = Rtn and c(Ctw) = Ctw. In
sequence 1 of Table 6.5 the user makes this venial error and so our tolerant enforcement
mechanism does not change the tentative execution of the user.
If an error is not venial, it should be corrected. We show such an example in sequence
2. Closing the protocol number window (Cpw) instead of inserting the research protocol
number (Irpn) is an error that should be corrected, so we can replace this action by
inserting the special number for the audit (InA), formally ex(Cpw) = Irpn, c(Cpw) = InA
and InA is a venial error. When performing the reimbursement of the drug, this number
will mean that the drug is for research but the protocol number inserted will be some
default number. By doing so we assure that the drug reimbursement will be done by a
correct party (clinical trial funds). Sequence 3 contains both types of errors: a venial
error of closing the therapeutical notes window (Ctw) instead of reviewing these notes
(Rtn) and an error of closing the protocol number window (Cpw) instead of inserting the
research protocol number (Irpn). Only error Cpw should be corrected because Ctw is a
venial error.
We propose a quasi-metric based on the replacing distance that counts a number of
venial errors.
Definition 6.2.1 The replacing distance with venial and amendable errors between two
finite traces is number of replacements that should be done in σ to get σ′ whenever the
replacement is a venial or an amendable error. Total function dvaR : Σ
∗ × Σ∗ → N ∪ {∞}
is a quasi-metric, such that
dvaR (σ, σ
′) =

0 if σ = · and σ′ = ·
dvaR (σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + dvaR (σ, σ
′) if σ = aσa and σ′ = bσb and a 6= b and
ex(a) = b
∞ otherwise
For example, if we compare a tentative execution sequence CloseNoteProtand a le-
gal sequence NoteResearchRun, we get the following replacing distance with venial and
amendable errors:
dvaR (CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) =
dvaR (Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr;Cpw;Dpres,Dis;Tnn;Rtn;Dr; Irpn;Dpres) = 2
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because ex(Ctw) = Rtn, ex(Cpw) = Irpn, and the rest of the actions in these two sequences
are equal.
We will use this distance when we compare a tentative execution sequence with the
legal sequence. For comparing the outputs of an enforcement mechanism we need another
distance, that calculates only venial errors:
Definition 6.2.2 The replacing distance with venial errors between two finite traces is
number of replacements that should be done in σ to get σ′ whenever the replacement is a
venial error. Total function dvR : Σ
∗ × Σ∗ → N ∪ {∞} is a quasi-metric, such that
dvR(σ, σ
′) =

0 if σ = · and σ′ = ·
dvR(σa, σ
′
a) if σ = aσa and σ
′ = aσ′a
1 + dvR(σ, σ
′) if σ = aσa and σ′ = bσb and a 6= b and
ex(a) = b and c(a) = a
∞ otherwise
By Ek we denote an enforcement mechanism can tolerate up to k venial errors and
correct amendable errors. For example, Ek can modify the illegal execution sequences in
this way:
Ek(CloseNoteProt) = Ek(Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr;Cpw;Dpres) = Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr; InA;Dpres
Ek(NoteResearchRun) = NoteResearchRun = Dis;Tnn;Rtn;Dr; Irpn;Dpres
Let us compare these outputs of an enforcement mechanism Ek using the distance
with venial errors:
dvR(Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr; InA;Dpres,Dis;Tnn;Rtn;Dr; Irpn;Dpres) = 2
because ex(Ctw) = Rtn and c(Ctw) = Ctw; ex(Cpw) = Irpn and c(InA) = InA, and the rest
of the actions in these two sequences are equal.
We will use the distance dvR to compare the outputs of enforcement mechanisms in
order to ensure that the outputs contain only venial errors, and no amendable errors.
6.2.2 Construction
In this section we present a construction of an enforcement mechanism in a form of edit
automaton. The input to our construction is a default security policy P , a maximum
number of venial errors k and two functions: function ex that defines an expected action
for a given invalid action and function c that defines a correction of this action. We will
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denote these inputs by I = 〈P, k, c, ex〉. The result is an edit automaton that transforms
the bad executions of the system by tolerating up to k errors.
Given the policy P represented as a Policy automaton AP =
〈
Σ, QP , qP0 , δ
P , F P
〉
, we
construct an edit automaton with the states (q, qF )
]s,p, where q is a state of a Policy
automaton, qF is the last accepting state before reaching q in some run, s is a number of
venial errors so far (we write s to denote the measure of soundness) and p is a number of
corrections made to the original execution (we write p to denote the measure of precision).
Notice that p is not bounded, it only gets increased when we correct amendable error in
a tentative execution sequence and is reset when the iteration is over.
Similar to Iterative Suppression automaton from Section 5.4, the constructed automa-
ton in this section also recognizes an execution as a sequence of iterations. The idea
behind this construction is that all the good iterations are not changed and all the bad
iterations are corrected if they contain up to k venial errors. Iterations that have more
than k venial errors are suppressed as soon as (k + 1)st error arrives. The amount of
venial errors so far is controlled by the state variable s.
The set of states of edit automaton for a given k is
Q = {(q, qF )]s,p|q ∈ QP , qF ∈ F P , 0 ≤ s ≤ k} ∪ {(q⊥, qF )]k,0|qF ∈ F P}
and an initial state is q0 = (q
P
0 , q
P
0 )
]0,0. We define the semantics of enforcement mechanism
in Figure 6.7. If a tentative execution sequence satisfies the policy, the edit automaton
“copies” the Policy automaton. If the sequence is accepted, it resets the counter of errors
[Good-Out]. If the sequence is not accepted, the automaton keeps counting the errors
[Good-Wait].
Otherwise a tentative execution sequence does not satisfy the policy. So, we check
whether more venial errors are allowed (s < k) and whether there exists a transition
starting at the state q on the expected action ex(e) that does not have to be corrected
(c(e) = e in [Venial-Out] and [Venial-Wait]). If such action has to be corrected, we
use c(e) that defines an appropriate correction (rules [Correct-Out] and [Correct-
Wait]). If none of the previous cases holds, we check whether this action can initiate a
new good iteration from the last visited accepting state qF (rules [Iteration-Out] and
[Iteration-Wait]). If there is no new iteration, we reach an error state (rule [Error]).
Notice that if there are no venial or amendable errors in the tentative execution, this
automaton behaves as an Iterative Suppression automaton. The first 5 rules define the
same semantics as the rules of Iterative Suppression automaton that we have defined in
Figure 5.8.
Even though this construction seems to be standard, it automatically generates an
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Good-Out
q
a−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P
((q, qF )
]s,p, a;σi, σk)
σk;a
↪→ ((q′, q′)]0,0, σi, ·)
Good-Wait
q
a−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P
((q, qF )
]s,p, a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF )]s,p, σi, σk; a)
Error
Otherwise
((q, qF )
]s,p, e;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q⊥, qF )]k,0, σi, ·)
Iteration-Out
q
a−→ ⊥ qF a−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P
((q, qF )
]s,p, a;σi, σk)
a
↪→ ((q′, q′)]0,0, σi, ·)
Iteration-Wait
q
a−→ ⊥ qF a−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P
((q, qF )
]s,p, a;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF )]0,0, σi, a)
Venial-Out
q
e−→ ⊥ q ex(e)−−−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P c(e) = e s < k
((q, qF )
]s,p, e;σi, σk)
σk;e
↪→ ((q′, q′)]0,0, σi, ·)
Venial-Wait
q
e−→ ⊥ q ex(e)−−−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P c(e) = e s < k
((q, qF )
]s,p, e;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF )]s+1,p, σi, σk; e)
Correct-Out
q
e−→ ⊥ q ex(e)−−−→ q′ q′ ∈ F P c(e) 6= e s < k
((q, qF )
]s,p, e;σi, σk)
σk;c(e)
↪→ ((q′, q′)]0,0, σi, ·)
Correct-Wait
if c(e) = ex(e) then s′ = s else s′ = s+ 1
q
e−→ ⊥ q ex(e)−−−→ q′ q′ /∈ F P c(e) 6= e s < k
((q, qF )
]s,p, e;σi, σk)
·
↪→ ((q′, qF )]s′,p+1, σi, σk; c(e))
Figure 6.7: Semantics for Error-toleration mechanism constructed from the Policy au-
tomaton.
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enforcement mechanism from the policy P , number of errors k and functions that define
expected actions and corrections.
6.2.3 Formal Properties
Lemma 6.2.1 Given inputs I = 〈P, k, c, ex〉, an enforcement mechanism Ek with the
semantics from Figure 6.7 is transparent:
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : P̂ (σ)⇒ Ek(σ) = σ (6.16)
Proof. For every sequence σ that satisfies the policy P , there exists an accepting run
in the policy automaton AP . Therefore, only rules [Good-Wait] and [Good-Out] are
used and the whole sequence σ is kept in the memory and is output upon reaching an
accepting state of the Policy automaton. Hence, Ek is transparent. 
Lemma 6.2.2 Given inputs I = 〈P, k, c, ex〉, an enforcement mechanism Ek with the
semantics from Figure 6.7 for every iteration σP ∈ P is such that
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : (dvaR (σ, σP ) ≤ k ⇒ dvR(Ek(σ), Ek(σP )) ≤ k) (6.17)
Proof. From the definition of replacing distance with venial and amendable errors it
follows that dvaR (σ, σP ) ≤ k means |σ| = |σP | and among all indices 0 < i ≤ |σ| there
are up to k indices i1, ...in (n ≤ k) such that for all 0 < j ≤ n: σ[ij] 6= σP [ij] and
ex(σ[ij]) = σP [ij]. For all the other indices l, we have σ[l] = σP [l].
Therefore, for the actions σ[i1], ..., σ[in] one of the rules [Venial-Out], [Venial-
Wait], [Correct-Out] or [Correct-Wait] holds. Since ex(σ[ij]) = σP [ij], there is
always a transition on ex(σ[ij]) in the Policy automaton and it’s always true that s < k
since there are only up to k actions in σ that are different from σP .
For all the other indices l different from i1, ..., in we have σ[l] = σP [l]. Hence, only
rules [Good-Out] or [Good-Wait] will be used.
So all the rules, where the action of σ is transformed to another action, will be applied
up to k times. Therefore, for every iteration σP (that by definition brings a Policy
automaton to an accepting state) every sequence σ such that dvaR (σ, σP ) ≤ k will be
transformed to a sequence Ek(σ), such that d
v
R(σ,Ek(σP )) ≤ k. Then, according to
Lemma 6.2.1, Ek(σP ) = σP , therefore theorem is proven. 
Theorem 6.2.1 Given inputs I = 〈P, k, c, ex〉, an enforcement mechanism Ek with the
semantics from Figure 6.7
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Table 6.6: Errors and their characteristics for drug dispensation process
Deviation e Expected action ex(e) Correction c(e)
The doctor does not review
the therapeutical notes (Ctw)
The doctor reviews ther-
apeutical notes (Rtn)
The doctor does not re-
view the therapeutical
notes (Ctw)
The doctor does not insert
the research protocol number
for the research drug (Cpw)
The doctor inserts the re-
search protocol number
(Irpn)
Insert a special number
for auditing (InA)
• is transparent: ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : P̂ (σ)⇒ Ek(σ) = σ,
• is predictable within k – for every iteration σP ∈ P :
∀ν ≥ k : ∃δ > 0 : ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : (dvaR (σ, σP ) ≤ δ ⇒ dvR(Ek(σ), Ek(σP )) ≤ ν) (6.18)
Proof. Given enforcement mechanism Ek is transparent according to Lemma 6.2.1, it
is predictable since for every ν ≥ k there exists δ = k such that
∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : (dvaR (σ, σP ) ≤ k ⇒ dvR(Ek(σ), Ek(σP )) ≤ k ≤ ν)
according to Lemma 6.2.2 
6.2.4 Enforcement of Drug Selection Process while Tolerating
Errors
Suppose k = 2 and the policy P represents a “default” protocol for a drug selection
process from Section 3.2. The functions for expected actions and corrected actions are
shown in Table 6.6.
Let us show how the illegal execution sequences for this process are modified by an
enforcement mechanism Ek constructed following the semantics from Figure 6.7.
The first sequence CloseNoteProt= Dis; Tnn; Ctw; Dr; Cpw; Dpres contains one venial
error: closing window action Ctw instead of reviewing therapeutical notes Rtn; and one
amendable error: closing a protocol window Cpw instead of inserting the research protocol
number Irpn.
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When we compare this tentative execution sequence and a valid sequence NoteRe-
searchRun = Dis; Tnn; Rtn; Dr; Irpn; Dpres, we have
dvaR (CloseNoteProt,NoteResearchRun) = 2
since ex(Ctw) = Rtn and ex(Cpw) = Irpn.
An enforcement mechanism Ek tolerates the venial error and corrects an amendable
error, so it modifies the sequence CloseNoteProt as follows:
Ek(CloseNoteProt) = Ek(Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr;Cpw;Dpres) = Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr; InA;Dpres
Now let us find the distance between the outputs of Ek given these two sequences:
dvR(Ek(CloseNoteProt), Ek(NoteResearchRun)) =
dvR(Dis;Tnn;Ctw;Dr; InA;Dpres,Dis;Tnn;Rtn;Dr; Irpn;Dpres) = 2
since ex(Ctw) = Rtn, c(Ctw) = Ctw, ex(InA) = Irpn and c(InA) = InA.
Notice that the behavior of Ek described in the example above corresponds to the
expected behavior that we described in Table 6.5.
6.2.5 Enforcement of an Anonymization Policy
Here we discuss one possible enforcement of an anonymization policy introduced in Ex-
ample 5.4.2. Recall that this policy allows only anonymized personally identifiable data
(pid) leave the system (corresponding pattern SendA∗).
In Section 5.4.5 we noticed that there is one more way to enforce anonymization policy
except for those provided in that chapter. We noticed that whenever a system attempts
to send non-anonymized pid, the enforcement mechanism can potentially substitute this
event to anonymization action followed by sending of previously anonymized data.
This modification corresponds to a case of amendable error: sending a non-anonymized
pid event SendN is an error, that is not allowed by the policy, however, it can be amended
by substituting SendN to a sequence of events Anonym; SendA. We can define a correction
function c(SendN) = Anonym; SendA, and use our Error-toleration mechanism automati-
cally constructed from a security policy SendA∗. For an action SendN the expected action
will be defined by a function ex(SendN) = SendA, and hence all the actions SendN will be
substituted by Anonym; SendA according to the rule Correct-Out from Figure 6.7.
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6.2.6 Discussion
In this section we used one assumption that k exists. We have made such conclusion after
several discussions with our partners from Hospital San Raffaele (HSR) in Milan, Italy.
According to these discussions, k exists, but it is not a single number for all the business
processes in the hospital, all the doctors and for all the years. In fact, it depends on a
number of parameters. Our discussions with HSR leads to a conclusion that the head of
the pharmacists and risk manager can agree on a particular k. For example, k can be
a number that depends on a particular doctor, a year, a particular business process, a
patient and a particular drug.
Our model considers one k and it is an abstraction of the reality that we have observed.
This is one of the assumptions we took based on our experience. In general case and in
other case studies, other assumptions can be made and they can influence the way the
enforcement of the security policies should be done. For example, in some legal system,
laws may not be specified very precisely to leave room for interpretation.
Let us come back to our original assumption about existence of k. On one hand,
specifying one policy and tolerating errors is easier to understand by users than the class
of situations in the legal system, where users would invite experts to “translate” the
meaning of this class of rules. On the other hand, specifying one policy and tolerating
errors is a particular case of the class of situations.
6.3 Summary
We have made two important contributions in this chapter.
First, we have discussed how to go beyond the (only) two classical properties used
to evaluate an enforcement mechanism: soundness and transparency. We have gradually
defined several notions that could describe predictable behavior and checked them against
the industrial case study on e-Health. The idea behind predictability is that there are “no
surprises on bad inputs”. In this way we have addressed Issue 3.
Second, we have addressed Issue 4 by constructing in a semi-automatic way an en-
forcement mechanism that can tolerate up to k errors given a “default” policy and a
specification of a simple list of errors and possibly their corrections.
We distinguished between two types of errors: venial and amendable errors. The
first group are simply not critical while the second group represents errors that can be
corrected. There is always yet another kind of actions called observable actions, that
cannot be changed but only observed. In order to avoid what auditors call ‘systematic
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errors” we limit the number of errors that the enforcement mechanism can tolerate.
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Conclusions
This thesis has addressed several problems of runtime enforcement theory,
starting from the gap between the security policies one can write and the en-
forcement mechanisms built for them, finishing with constructing enforcement
mechanisms that can tolerate user errors. In this final chapter of the thesis
we summarize our primary contributions that improve the state of the art in
runtime enforcement theory.
We have presented a number of challenges in runtime enforcement theory in Sec-
tion 1.2. This section shows how all these challenges have been met by our contributions.
Classification of enforcement mechanisms We addressed the first challenge of
this thesis (Issue 1) by investigating relations between different kinds of edit automata.
As a result, we have discovered that what makes them different is not what they do when
an execution is valid (because nothing should happen according to transparency), but
what actually happens when an execution is invalid. The results of this contribution have
been published in [12, 14].
Automatic construction of enforcement mechanisms and iterative proper-
ties To the best of our knowledge, the state-of-the-art literature does not propose an
automatic construction of an enforcement mechanism from a given security policy (Is-
sue 2). In this thesis we provided several algorithms to construct an edit automaton
from a security policy represented as a Policy automaton (an automaton that combines
the acceptance conditions of a finite-state automaton and a Bu¨chi automaton). We first
followed the idea of a construction found in the proof of Theorem 8 from [7], as a result
we obtained a particular kind of edit automata, that we call Longest-valid-prefix automa-
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ton, because it always outputs the longest valid prefix of the given tentative execution
sequence.
We also propose a construction of another particular kind of edit automaton that
is able to enforce a special kind of security properties in a more acceptable way than
it is done by a Longest-valid-prefix automaton. This new mechanism is called Iterative
Suppression automaton, it suppresses illegal parts of the invalid execution.
We have further investigated the class of policies enforceable by Iterative Suppression
automata and found that they are capable of enforcing a new class of properties called
iterative properties. We have also established a relation between iterative properties and
safety, liveness and renewal properties.
We showed the difference between the Longest-valid-prefix automaton and the Iter-
ative Suppression automaton by means of examples, representing simple policies and a
policy from our industrial case study. The results of this contribution have been published
in [17, 15].
Predictability We have found that there is a gap in the theory of runtime en-
forcement: two enforcement mechanisms can effectively enforce (i.e., while being sound
and transparent) a given security policy in completely different ways. In Issue 3 we have
stated that the notions of soundness and transparency are not sufficient.
We have proposed a new notion that characterizes the behavior of enforcement mecha-
nisms when they transform bad executions. This notion called predictability complements
the notions of soundness and transparency. We have presented several examples of pre-
dictable and not predictable enforcement mechanisms for our main case studies in this
thesis. The results of this contribution have been published in [16].
Error-toleration We have addressed Issue 4 by constructing in a semi-automatic
way an enforcement mechanism that can tolerate up to k errors. Given a “default” policy,
that describes a predefined behavior of the system, and a specification of a simple list of
errors with their possible corrections, we propose a novel construction of edit automata.
We have proven the formal properties of this kind of edit automata and explained how
this enforcement mechanism can enforce a “default” policy from our industrial case study.
The results of this contribution have been published in [13].
In summary, solutions to all the problems specified in this thesis are given. By the
main contributions indicated above, we have presented a number of improvements upon
the state of the art. Our contribution on the classification of enforcement mechanisms
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explains the gap in the theory of runtime enforcement; our construction of enforcement
mechanisms and error-toleration provides a new approach to make the theory of runtime
enforcement more constructive; finally, our notion of predictability proposes to make the
theory of runtime enforcement more predictable.
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